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A Cultural Perspective
on American Tax Policy
Sharon C. Nantell*
I view the role of this article as that of a "warm-up act." The
subsequent articles in this journal either raise issues regarding
revising the current tax code, or present arguments for or against
alternative forms of federal taxation in the new millennium.
However, in order to fully appreciate these proposed revisions and
alternatives, I believe we need to truly understand and appreciate
our current federal income tax system, and, as importantly, how
we arrived at where we are today.
I have always been a firm believer in the fact that we cannot
truly understand where we are going if we do not understand and
appreciate how we got where we are today. A cultural perspective
will tell us more than "just the facts." Hopefully, it will illuminate
some of the "whys" behind the current federal income tax system.
That analysis, in turn, will assist us in determining what paths to
take in the future.
I. INTRODUCTION: A PERSONAL PERSPECTIVE
Let me begin with a story. It was 1978. I was 27 years old
and had just been accepted into the Masters of Law in Taxation
program at Georgetown University Law Center. Washington,
D.C., was a new experience for me. Viewing the constant stream
of busses to the Capitol, however, I realized that I was apparently
the only living person who had never taken a grade school or high
school field trip to D.C. So, at 27, I set out to see the sights.
Before I describe what I did on my first self-directed sightsee-
ing trip, I must inform you of my personal historical perspective.
By the age of 27, I had already worked for the Internal Revenue
Service for three years while attending law school in Cleveland,
Ohio.' I had also worked in corporate America, in the tax depart-
* Professor of Law, Chapman University School of Law. B.A., Cleveland State Uni-
versity (1973); J.D., Cleveland-Marshall College of Law (1976); LL.M., Taxation, Ge-
orgetown University Law Center (1979). The author wishes to acknowledge the research
assistance of Cindy Adams, Class of 1999, Chapman University School of Law.
1 My three-year stint with the Internal Revenue Service while I attended law school
has forever earned me the Scarlet Letter "I" in the eyes of my law students (despite more
than two decades of service in the name of the taxpayer).
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ment of the Sherwin-Williams Company at the corporate head-
quarters office. Tax was basically my life. Much to my mother's
dismay, I was leaving my Fortune 500 job for the life of a poor law
student, to steep myself in the intricacies of the Internal Revenue
Code, and I was actually excited about it!
So, where did I go? Not to the Washington Monument, nor the
Lincoln Memorial, nor the Capitol Building. Instead, I drove
through the nightmarish D.C. traffic to the main Internal Reve-
nue Service Building, not motivated by a belief in the IRS as an
institution, but rather by intrigue for the role that taxes played in
our American society. Perhaps still flush with some idealism left
over from the 1960s, I hoped to make the world a better place, and
the tax system a better system. Thus, I was impressed with, and
inspired by, the large words inscribed in stone over the entrance
to the building:
Taxes are what we pay for civilized society.2
-Oliver Wendell Holmes
I believed that statement then and, 20 years later, I tenuously
continue to hold on to that belief.
I am now an aging tax professor. I am teaching students who
were toddlers when I was at Georgetown in 1978. When I recently
read the Holmes quote to one of my classes, the students laughed.
I was startled by their response, but mostly I was troubled. What
had gone wrong? Or perhaps, more accurately, was it ever right to
begin with? If it was, what had changed to so damage or destroy
our underlying belief in our federal tax system?
Beliefs and values are the focus of this article, since a cultural
perspective on American tax policy necessitates an examination of
culture itself. Culture is defined as the integrated pattern of
human knowledge, belief, and behavior that depends upon man's
capacity for learning and transmitting knowledge to succeeding
generations.' A college course in cultural anthropology nearly 30
years ago opened my eyes to human cultures throughout the
world, and throughout the ages, with respect to social structures,
language, law, politics, religion, art, and technology. For example,
no matter whether sophisticated or remote, I discovered that
every societal group throughout the world had developed religion
as an integral part of its culture-a belief in some being or force
greater than themselves. Whenever groups of people live to-
gether, they develop rules to govern behavior: to encourage certain
actions and to discourage other actions. Our choices of language,
2 Compania General de Tabacos de Filipinas v. Collector of Internal Revenue, 275
U.S. 87, 100 (1927) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
3 See WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DicTIONARY 314 (1985).
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law, politics, and religion are reflections of what our society values
and believes.
Why do we choose to live in societal groups? There are simply
some things that a group can provide for us that we cannot pro-
vide for ourselves. The tangible benefit of protection, for example,
and the intangible benefit of social interaction immediately come
to mind. The group benefits come to us at some cost; e.g., we must
share physical resources and individual skills in order to provide
protection for the group.
Thus, a society's choice of a system of taxation speaks
volumes about what that society values and believes.4 In societal
groups, humans share. How a particular society chooses to share
its resources or revenues among villagers or throughout a nation
is reflective of what that society holds dear in its culture. There is
both a cost and a benefit to this sharing. The societal objective is
to make the benefit outweigh the cost, as perceived by the values
and beliefs of that particular society. According to Justice
Holmes, in the society of the United States in 1927, the cost of
taxes bought the benefit of civilization in the form of goods and
services provided by the government.5
We tax ourselves as the price for living in a particular civi-
lized society. If a group in a village goes off to hunt or fish and is
expected to share its "catch of the day" with others in the village
upon its return, then that sharing is, in effect, a tax upon their
catch.' If we, as a society, choose to tax income at the federal level
rather than the transfer of goods and services, through, for exam-
ple, a national sales tax, then that conscious choice says some-
thing about what we believe. The choices we make within the tax
system, and continue to make, also reflect the evolving values of
our culture.
When we examine our American tax policy from this perspec-
tive, what values and beliefs do we find? What do we hold near
and dear to our hearts? Have our values changed over the years or
4 "Ultimately, decisions as to how a polity should finance its public spending reveal
as much about the character of the regime as how it chooses to spend the revenue." Shel-
don D. Pollack, Tax Reform: The 1980s in Perspective, 46 TAX L. REV. 489, 496 (1991).
Professor Alice Abreu concludes that our choice of an income tax is not accidental: "tax
systems are products of human creation. They exist because they serve human objectives,
reflecting the values of their designers. A tax system's design can reveal much about those
values." Alice G. Abreu, Taxes, Power, and Personal Autonomy, 33 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1, 16
(1996).
5 See Compania General de Tabacos de Filipinas, 275 U.S. at 100.
6 A society in which members are expected to share the proceeds of a hunt with
others is, in effect, imposing a tax on that hunt .... In the most basic of senses,
then, I heartily agree with Justice Holmes that taxes are the price we pay for
civilization [citation omitted]. Indeed, I might go even further and say that taxa-
tion, that is, the means by which we share resources, is an essential part of
civilization.
Abreu, supra note 4, at 16 n.34.
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are some fundamental, unshakable values still reflected in the tax
code today? What behavior is encouraged or discouraged? What
"tax culture" are we passing on from one generation to the next?
With these questions in mind, our journey begins.
What I will ultimately conclude is that imposing a tax-any
tax-is both powerful and manipulative. The focus of our Ameri-
can tax system, from excise taxes and tariff duties in the early
years of the nation to the current federal income tax, never has
been upon distributive justice, or any kind of justice, for that mat-
ter. Since 1789, those with the least power have borne the heavi-
est burden of taxation in the United States. By 1917, Congress
had discovered that very slight changes in the structure of the
new federal income tax could reap great quantities of revenue.
Deductions, capital gains preferences, and rate changes started
early and have occurred often.
Taxes may be the price we pay for civilization, but how civi-
lized is our tax system itself? What values and beliefs are repre-
sented in our current structure? Our historical review leads us to
an appreciation that, as a society, we may not really believe that
the wealthy should pay more, despite our allegedly progressive
tax rate schedule. We begrudgingly tax the wealthy at a slightly
higher rate mainly because it is both easy and lucrative to do so,
and because it makes good political sense from the point of view of
a legislator. We are not motivated, and have never been moti-
vated, however, to do so out of some basic sense of justice.
II. OUR FEDERAL TAX SYSTEM: HISTORY, VALUES, AND BEHAVIOR
The first ingredient to be examined in our cultural tax per-
spective is knowledge. We must be knowledgeable about our fed-
eral system of taxation. The significance of this factor is twofold:
(1) knowledge of our tax system itself; and (2) knowledge of our
tax history.
With its current complexity, it is all but impossible to "know"
the entire Internal Revenue Code. Even alleged tax "experts" will
likely admit that they are current in their knowledge of only cer-
tain areas of the Code. So, if the experts cannot master the entire
Code, what chance do average taxpayers have? The complexity of
the Internal Revenue Code has been the topic of discussion of tax
reform for many years. No matter how much discussion takes
place, however, the Code just keeps growing. In the 1997 revenue
act, for example, 825 Code sections were revised and 285 new sec-
tions were added to the Code.7 Taxpayers are overwhelmed and
fearful that, without assistance, they will miss tax deductions and
7 See Early Spring Anxiety, PROVIDENCE J.-BuLL., Apr. 25, 1998, at A12. There were
also 271 new IRS regulations in 1997. See id.
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credits otherwise available to them. Thus, in 1996, more than 60
million taxpayers, representing one-half of all those filing, paid
preparers to fill out their tax returns.8
An important fact not to be overlooked here is that whatever
knowledge Americans possess about the federal income tax is
passed on to succeeding generations. Even if the information we
possess is not correct, our perceptions get passed on to our family
members. My students come to my federal income tax class, for
example, as relative novices to the federal tax system. In fact, it is
ironic to teach tax to a group of people who have only liabilities
(from their student loans) and no income! Yet, invariably, they al-
ready have very definite attitudes toward the federal tax system.
Fully 90% of them are fearful of a tax system that impacts their
lives and the lives of their soon-to-be clients. The knowledge ob-
tained in the course, however, empowers even the most fearful,
even though it barely scratches the surface of the Internal Reve-
nue Code.
The fundamental problem regarding knowledge and the In-
ternal Revenue Code is the amazingly steep tax learning curve.
Our students might even call it a slippery slope. As taxpayers, we
feel driven to "know what the rich people know." If Code sections
are available to us that we do not know about, we feel stupid and
taken. We have defaulted money to the federal government that
is rightfully ours to keep. Thus, tax planning, tax preparation,
and the computer technology associated with self-preparation
have become driving forces in our current tax culture.
A final observation regarding knowledge is the difficult task of
appreciating the hidden aspects of taxation. We are aware, of
course, of the taxes we pay outright, but what about the so-called
hidden taxes: the excise taxes on gasoline, cigarettes, and alcohol
built into the cost of the goods; the corporate income tax passed
along into the economy to be paid by others; and the employer's
portion of the Social Security tax?9 No matter what the tax,
whether it is a sales tax, an income tax, a corporate tax, an em-
ployment tax, or a tax upon trusts, people, not entities, pay
taxes. 10 An in-depth analysis of the issues surrounding the size
8 In 1996, 60,858,000 individual income tax returns were fied with paid preparer
signatures. See INTEmAL REVENUE SERVICE, INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX RETURNS, STATISTICS
OF INCOME BULLETIN, Summer 1998, at 177 tbl.22 [hereinafter STATISTICS OF INCOME]. A
total of 120,351,208 returns were filed. See id. at 150 tbl.3.
9 See Edward J. McCaffery, Cognitive Theory and Tax, 41 UCLA L. REV. 1861, 1874-
86 (1994).
io Keep in mind that taxes are borne by people .... All taxes ultimately translate
into changes in individuals' purchasing power .... We speak of the 'nominal inci-
dence' of a tax as the measured payments of tax by individuals or institutions. The
'real incidence,' or economic incidence, is the true burden, which can fall only on
people.
DAVID F. BRADFORD, UNTANGLING THE INCOME TAX 133-34 (1986).
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and complexity of our tax law is beyond the scope of this article,
but these issues impact every aspect of our analysis as we ex-
amine knowledge, beliefs, and behavior in our cultural perspective
on the Internal Revenue Code.
The second primary aspect of knowledge is historical perspec-
tive. It is, in my estimation, critical to an understanding of the
federal system of individual income taxation that we adequately
reflect upon its evolution over the years. How did we originally
fund the activities of our early, central federal government? Who
in the population bore the primary burden of federal taxation? It
was not until 1913, fully 124 years after the Constitutional Con-
vention of 1789, that Congress enacted a relatively straightfor-
ward tax upon "income from whatever source derived,"" after
struggling with the concept in previous decades. The enactment
of this federal system of income taxation was made possible only
by the passage of the 16th Amendment in February 1913. Thus,
the questions become: how and why did we arrive upon "income"
as our tax base, what values were reflected in a federal system
that taxed income, and what was considered "income" in 1913?
My initial goal is to briefly bring to light the amazing history
of the federal system of taxation. This article attempts to illumi-
nate not just the facts, but also the values and beliefs reflected in
our tax history, the choices Congress made along the way, and
who historically bore the major burden of the federal taxes. Our
discovery will be that the road to the federal taxation of income
was one of "War and Panic."
A. Knowledge: The Evolution of the Federal Tax System
History, of course, can influence us only if we actually know,
understand, and appreciate what happened. Otherwise, our per-
ceptions about history, right or wrong, will dictate our future.
What we believe to be true about the evolution of the federal tax
system and what actually occurred may be accurate-or not.
Noted scholars and historians previously have detailed the history
of the federal income tax. 2 My intention in this section is to em-
phasize cultural perspectives and observations throughout the
factual, historical summary.
11 Section 22 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1913 (now I.R.C. § 61 (1994)).
12 See, most notably, RANDOLPH E. PAUL, TAXATION IN THE UNITED STATES (1954);
JOHN F. WITTE, THE POLITICS AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX (1985); and
ROBERT STANLEY, DIMENSIONS OF LAW IN THE SERVICE OF ORDER: ORIGINS OF THE FEDERAL
INCOME TAX 1861-1913 (1993). These authors are extensively cited throughout this section
of the article.
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1. The Early Federal System: Excise Taxes and Tariffs
When our Republic was formed, the primary societal concern
was the preservation of the states. The states were reluctant to
relinquish any taxing power to the national government. The col-
onies had no national system of taxation, and none was estab-
lished for the national government under the Articles of
Confederation. 3 No national tariff could be levied without an
amendment to the Articles of Confederation, which required
unanimous consent of the states. 4 The new federal government
had to rely upon a process of requisitioning the states for revenue
in proportion to the value of their lands and improvements. 5 The
states viewed these requests as voluntary contributions, which
were not paid, and the new government, thoroughly bankrupt, ul-
timately defaulted on its considerable debt. 16
The new Constitution adopted in 1789 addressed these finan-
cial concerns. In Article I, the Constitution gave Congress the
"Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to
pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general
Welfare of the United States" and specified that "all Duties, Im-
posts and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United
States." 7 In addition, Article I prohibited a direct tax "unless in
Proportion to the Census or Enumeration" 8 and prohibited the
federal government from imposing a tax or duty "on Articles ex-
ported from any State."9
Thus was born a federal tariff"° and an elaborate and unpopu-
lar federal system of excise taxes. Between 1789 and 1800, the
initial tax-of-choice of the new centralized federal government was
the excise tax. Taxes were imposed on carriages, the sale of cer-
tain liquor, the manufacture of snuff, the refining of sugar, auction
sales, legal investments and bonds.2' Congress adopted a stamp
tax upon legal instruments as well as "a direct tax upon dwelling
houses, land, and slaves, which was apportioned among the states
on the basis of population."22 Open rebellion against the excise tax
on whiskey ensued in western Pennsylvania in 1794; federal ex-
cise officials were attacked, and President Washington was com-
13 See PAUL, supra note 12, at 4.
14 ARTS. OF CONFED. arts. VIII, XIII.
15 Id. art. VIII.
16 See PAUL, supra note 12, at 5.
17 U.S. Const., art. I, § 8, c. 1.
is Id. § 9, cl. 4.
19 Id. § 9, cl. 5.
2o The Madison bill, the first American tariff act, became law in 1789. See PAUL,
supra note 12, at 7.
21 See PAL, supra note 12, at 5-6.
22 Id. at 6.
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pelled to send 15,000 federal troops to restore the authority of the
federal government.23
The Whiskey Rebellion was not an auspicious beginning for
the federal taxing power. What cultural observations are we enti-
tled to at this point? Colonial Americans did not react well to a
new system of federal taxation. The idea of a centralized govern-
ment itself was a hard-fought issue among the states, and funding
its operation was to be another. It appears that hostilities erupted
because the change was simply too much too soon. Resentment
arose as a consequence of rapid imposition of excise taxes upon so
many items and at rates that were exceedingly high.24 Early
resistance to providing the federal government with any source of
revenue at all already existed. A heavy federal tax hand was not
reflective of this new collective society of colonies. It seems plausi-
ble that there were few believers among the general public in the
benefits to be derived from this new, abstract, and remote federal
government. 5
The Jefferson administration (1801-1809) relied upon the
tariff as the federal government's primary source of revenue and
abolished most of the early system of excise taxes.26 The need for
revenue during the War of 1812, however, brought back both ex-
cise taxes and direct but apportioned taxes upon dwelling houses,
lands, and slaves.2 ' After the war, when heavy trade with England
threatened to ruin American manufacturers, the emphasis in
tariff planning turned, for the first time, from revenue production
to the protection of American industry. 5
By the 1850s, the federal tax system drew 92% of its total rev-
enue from import duties.29 Tariff schedules included manufac-
tures, from machine tools to luxury items, raw materials such as
mining and agricultural products, and a free list of varying size.30
Importers initially paid the taxes but passed the cost along to the
ultimate consumers by raising the prices on these imported goods.
This system was thought to provide a competitive price edge to
23 See STEPHEN B. PRESSER & JAMIL S. ZAINALDIN, LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE IN AMERI-
CAN HISTORY: CASES AND MATERIALS 151 (3d ed. 1995).
24 See PAUL, supra note 12, at 6. A gallon of whiskey in the early 1790s cost 50 cents;
while the maximum whiskey excise tax was 30 cents per gallon. Id.
25 It is always dangerous to make generalizations about a society as diverse as the
original 13 colonies, just as it is difficult to make generalizations about our current popula-
tion of more than 270 million Americans. However, throughout this cultural perspective, it
will be the questions that we ask and the observations that we make that will inform our
discussion.
26 The tariff was a consumption tax initially imposed upon imported luxury items, but
ultimately imposed upon hundreds of basic items. See PAUL, supra note 12, at 6.
27 See id.
28 See id. at 7.
29 See STANLEY, supra note 12, at 25.
30 See STANLEY, supra note 12, at 26 n.38 (citing FRANK W. TAUSSIG, THE TARIFF IN
UNITED STATES HISTORY (8th ed. 1967)).
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similar goods produced domestically. Thus, the so-called "protec-
tive tariffs" were not just a source of federal revenue. These taxes
initially reflected attitudes of making the rich pay more than the
poor through tariffs on luxury items, with the added benefit that
the tariff could, supposedly, stimulate domestic economic
growth.3 1
To tax the rich on luxury items may have been the initial ra-
tionale for the tariff system. Its base broadened tremendously
over the years, however, evolving into a regressive tax system
borne heavily by the laboring masses, taxing every imported item
from the food they put on the table to the clothes on their backs. It
has been convincingly argued that, during this period of tremen-
dous growth, a conscious decision was made to subsidize economic
development 32 through the legal system rather than the tax sys-
tem.3 Thus, a disproportionate share of the burden of economic
growth fell upon the least empowered members of society.
Throughout the 1800s, state governments depended primarily
upon the property tax, supplemented by excise taxes on slaves,
31 See id. at 25-26.
32 Indeed, the law of negligence became a leading means by which the dynamic
and growing forces in American society were able to challenge and eventually
overwhelm the weak and relatively powerless segments of the American economy.
After 1840 the principle that one could not be held liable for socially useful activity
exercised with due care became a commonplace of American law. In the process,
the conception of property gradually changed from the eighteenth century view
that dominion over land above all conferred the power to prevent others from in-
terfering with one's quiet enjoyment of property to the nineteenth century as-
sumption that the essential attribute of property ownership was the power to
develop one's property regardless of the injurious consequences to others.
MORTON J. HORWITz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAw: 1780-1860, at 99 (1977).
33 One of the most striking aspects of legal change during the antebellum period
is the extent to which common law doctrines were transformed to create immuni-
ties from legal liability and thereby to provide substantial subsidies for those who
undertook schemes of economic development .... What factors led antebellum
statesmen generally to turn to subsidization through the legal, rather than the
tax, system? One explanation seems fairly clear. Change brought about through
technical legal doctrine can more easily disguise underlying political choices. Sub-
sidy through the tax system, by contrast, inevitably involves greater dangers of
political conflict .... Nevertheless, it does seem fairly clear that the tendency of
subsidy through legal change during this period was dramatically to throw the
burden of economic development on the weakest and least active elements in the
population.... There is reason to suppose, therefore, that the choice of subsidiza-
tion through the legal system was not simply an abstract effort to avoid political
contention but that it entailed more conscious decisions about who would bear the
burdens of economic growth. It does seem likely, moreover, that regardless of the
actual distributional effects of resorting to the existing tax system, a more general
fear of the redistributional potential of taxation played an important role in deter-
mining the view that encouragement of economic growth should occur not through
the tax system, but through the legal system.... Thus, whether or not legal subsi-
dies to enterprise were optimally efficient or instead encouraged overinvestment
in technology, it does seem quite likely that they did contribute to an increase in
inequality by throwing a disproportionate share of the burdens of economic growth
on the weakest and least organized groups in American society.
Id. at 99-101.
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carriages, and personal property in general.' Local governments
relied primarily upon the property tax as well. In 1890, the prop-
erty tax produced 72% of state revenues and 92% of local reve-
nues.3 5 In the early 1800s, more than 80% of the populace lived in
rural areas; thus a tax levied on the value of land impacted most
of the population and had the effect of taxing the holders of the
most valuable land most heavily, effectuating an ability-to-pay
philosophy. 6
What does the developing system of taxation in the states tell
us about our cultural values and beliefs? First, hard money was
scarce, and the voting public was not accustomed to the idea that
it should pay any appreciable chunk of their income or wealth to
the state. 7 Second, early in the 1800s, wealth was defined in
terms of property. As the century progressed, however, dramatic
societal changes occurred. New kinds of wealth, in the form of
commercial paper, stocks, and other evidences of debt, were ex-
panding but were not being reached by the property tax system."
The property tax system also was not reaching salaries. The in-
crease in both mercantile and manufacturing activity brought
large new populations to the cities, and these populations de-
pended on salaries for their livelihood. 39 It was more than just co-
incidence that when the federal government needed more revenue
to fund the cost of the Civil War, it turned to the new rising source
of wealth: income.
2. The Civil War and the First Federal Income Tax
Robert Stanley provides the following perspective on wealth
in the United States just before the Civil War:
[of the adult males living in the ten largest urban counties in
1860, over half owned no property whatsoever, and nearly 60
percent had under $100 worth. Moreover, wealth was more un-
equally held in the cities than in rural areas. Nevertheless,
across the rural/urban dimension the corpus of wealth remained
in astonishingly few hands. Nationwide, the top 10 percent of
the families owned approximately 72 percent of the gross na-
tional wealth in 1860, and the trend was toward greater ine-
quality by 1900.40
34 See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAw 185 (2d ed. 1985).
35 See id. at 567.
36 See STANLEY, supra note 12, at 25.
37 See FRIEDMAN, supra note 34, at 567.
38 See STANLEY, supra note 12, at 25.
39 See id.
40 Id. at 23 n.32. General observations concerning the Civil War and wealth in 1860
would not be complete without reference to slavery. Any cultural perspective of America,
whether tax policy or otherwise, must address our 200-year history of slavery and its lin-
gering societal aftermath.
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Congress was desperately in need of revenue to fund the Civil
War. In 1861 and 1862, Congress enacted the first income tax leg-
islation. The federal government, however, was still primarily
funded through the tariff system on imports, although the sale of
federal war bonds provided a substantial surge in federal revenue.
Professor Stanley observes that:
[t]he result of the fiscal decisions made during the early war
years was a war effort almost completely dependent upon the
investments of private financiers, and the creation of a revenue
structure designed to establish credit, to fund ordinary opera-
tions including debt maintenance, and to draw taxes through a
system acknowledged to be thoroughly regressive and consump-
tion-oriented. Only income taxation seemed to promise that the
burdens of the war would not ultimately fall, in the words of
John Sherman, "entirely" on the shoulders of "the poorer
class."41
The basic structure of exemptions, graduated tax rates, and
deductions introduced in the income tax law of 1862 still persists
in the Internal Revenue Code as we know it today. The $600 ex-
emption level reflected the intention to reach only a tiny, wealthy
fraction of the population.42 The very low and slightly graduated
rates-from 3 to 5% on incomes over $600 and $10,000, respec-
tively-reflected the concerns of a leadership reluctant to use the
power of the law to affect the wealthiest portions of the population
substantially, while at the same time affirming the principle of
"ability to pay."43 Deductions of federal, state and local taxes were
The American style of black-white relations can be traced far back into the colonial
past.... The exact legal origins of slavery are obscure; but clearly it was develop-
ing custom that guided the lawmaker's hand. Slavery did not exist in the mother
country. Early references to slaves and slavery have a certain vagueness and am-
biguity. Yet before the end of the 17th century, slavery had become a definite legal
status in both the North and the South; it is peculiarly associated with blacks; it
had become a terrible, timeless condition, inherited by children from their
mothers. The legal status of the slave, as it took shape in statute books, reflected
and ratified social discrimination and race. [citation omitted] ... Once the funda-
mental lines of the law were set, the colonies, particularly in the South, carried the
logic of slavery to its grim outer limits. The slave was property, a capital asset of
his master. He passed by will, was bought and sold, could be seized for his
master's debts, and was taxed like other property.... Slavery was a coiled spring.
In the end, it was a trap for whites as well. The whites, of course, had the upper
hand; but even they paid the price in the long run. Slavery was one of the irritants
that brought on a great civil war. Hundreds of thousands died, victims in a sense
of the South's "peculiar institution."
FRIEDMAN, supra note 34, at 85-86, 229. An in-depth analysis of slavery is beyond the scope
of this article. For an enlightening collection of works and cases on the subject, see
PRESSER & ZAiNALDIN, supra note 23, at 376-442.
41 Stanley, supra note 12, at 32.
42 See PAUL, supra note 12, at 10. A cashier on the Commissioner of Internal Reve-
nue's staff earned an annual salary of only $1600, for example, while collecting $37 million
of taxes in six months. See id.
43 See STANLEY, supra note 12, at 30.
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allowed under the 1862 Act." The 1862 Act also imposed an inher-
itance tax of .75% to 5% on personalty in excess of $1000, depend-
ing on the relationship of the heirs.4"
The income tax was increased in 1864, doubling the top rate
to 10%1 and authorizing deductions of mortgage interest, repairs,
and losses from the sale of lands.47 Income taxes were reduced in
1867, and again in 1870 when the inheritance tax was repealed.'
By 1869, the yield from the federal inheritance tax had reached
more than $3 million, with the greater part of the taxes being col-
lected at the lowest rates. 49 About 55% of the inheritance taxes
collected came from New York, Massachusetts, and
Pennsylvania."°
From 1862 to 1866, no more than 1.3% of the American people
ever paid federal income tax.51 The use of income as the basis of
taxation, coupled with high exemption levels, "had the effect of
targeting a group drawn primarily from the most heavily urban
states and regions of the country, just as opponents of the tax
would charge, and gave to the protectionists the 'victims' they
sought to hold up before the eyes of the poor, rural, and Western
constituents."52 In 1864, 61.3% of the revenue from the income tax
came from taxpayers in just three states (New York, Massachu-
setts, and Pennsylvania), and together the Northeast yielded
about 76% of all income tax revenue.53 The Civil War income taxes
made no attempt to levy a tax upon capital gains, other than capi-
tal gains arising from real estate held for a short period.54
The federal income tax was allowed to expire in 1872 when
the federal government was enjoying large budget surpluses' 5 At
the same time, Congress sent additional good news to constituents
in the form of the Tariff Act of 1872.56 The Tariff Act placed popu-
lar items such as coffee and tea on the free list, adopted a 10%
reduction on major protected items, and expanded the free list
slightly with some minor items used by manufacturers.57
44 See PAUL, supra note 12, at 13.
45 See id. at 10.
46 See MICHAEL J.GRAETZ AND DEBORAH H. SCHENK, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION: PRIN-
CIPLES AND POLICIES 6 (3d ed. 1995).
47 See PAUL, supra note 12, at 13.
48 See GRAETZ & SCHENK, supra note 46, at 6.
49 See PAUL, supra note 12, at 17.
5o See id.
51 See STANLEY, supra note 12, at 39-40.
52 Id. at 40.
53 See id. at 40-41.
54 See PAL, supra note 12, at 13.
55 See GRAETz & SCHENK, supra note 46, at 6-7.
56 See STANLEY, supra note 12, at 55.
57 See id.
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Thus Congress abandoned income and returned to consump-
tion as its major source of tax revenue. The year 1872 was not the
first time, and certainly would not be the last, that Congress acted
to reduce taxes when faced with a strong economy and fiscal
surplus.
3. A Tumultuous Time: 1873-1900
Just one year later, the Panic of 1873 caused 5,000 businesses
to fail, and 10,478 closed before the country turned a corner in
1879.58 The Panic of 1873 was "essentially the result of years of
over-trading, over-production, over-speculation, over-issues of pa-
per money and inflated prices."5 9 Thirty-seven banks and broker-
age houses closed on September 18, 1873.60 Two days later, the
Stock Exchange closed for an unprecedented 10 days.6 Railroads
and additional banks were soon forced to shut down, which af-
fected the fortunes of thousands of merchants and farmers.2
After the Panic of 1873, the country witnessed a very long
struggle against the tariff system of taxation. Between 1873 and
1879, congressmen from the Middle West and the South intro-
duced 14 different income tax bills.63 In the meantime, the high
tariff piled up huge and embarrassing Treasury surpluses. In
1875, a Republican Congress repealed the 10% reduction made in
1872 as a concession to tariff reformers.64 A Tariff Commission
was authorized by Congress in 1882; tariffs, however, remained a
protective device to help American business, much to the disap-
pointment of the rest of the world and in spite of the enormous
costs to farmers and laborers. 5
An 1883 act raised duties even higher on protected articles
imported in large volume. Grover Cleveland, the Democratic
President elected in 1884,66 called the tariff "ruthless extortion,"
and unsuccessfully urged tariff reduction. In 1888 Harrison de-
feated Cleveland, and, with the Republicans back in power elected
on a protectionist platform, Congress passed the McKinley Tariff
58 See THE ALMANAC OF AMERICAN HISTORY 325 (Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. et al. eds.,
1993) [hereinafter ALMANAC].
59 Id.
60 See id. at 324-25.
61 See id. at 325.
62 See id.
63 See PAUL, supra note 12, at 30.
64 See id. at 31.
65 See ALMANAC, supra note 58, at 349. President Arthur appointed nine members to
the Tariff Commission. John L. Hayes, the Secretary of the National Association of Wool
Manufacturers and not exactly a disinterested party, was named chairman. See id.
66 See id. at 356. Cleveland was the first Democratic President to be elected since
James Buchanan, who served from 1857-1861. See id.
67 See PAUL, supra note 12, at 31. The Democratic House was united in support of
Cleveland. The Republicans in control of the Senate, however, prevented any action. See
id.
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Act of October 1, 1890, increasing the average rate imposed upon
dutiable imports to 48%.68 According to tax historian Randolph
Paul, "[tihis legislation as much as any one fact led to a rout of the
Republicans in the 1890 election. "69
What cultural observations are we entitled to at this point?
The political process we choose to govern ourselves is, of course,
an integral component of our culture. We are not the world's only
democratic society, but our three-part system of executive, legisla-
tive, and judicial branches, with its intricate interrelationships, is
unique to our American system of government. So how did gov-
ernmental process respond to the dire poverty, labor unrest, and
general economic crisis of this tumultuous period? The historical
party system of Democrats and Republicans apparently did not
respond well in the eyes of the American people. Farmers70 and
laborers71 were pitted against merchants and bankers. The Mid-
west, South, and the West battled with wealthy Eastern capital-
ists. Noted historian Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. offers this sad
observation for the year 1880:
[1aborer, farmer, city dweller, politician flounder in paradoxes
presented to them by new needs. Cherished values and protec-
tions of free men are being lost just when a promised better
world seems within grasp. Now, when the nation could have
profited from vigorous public debate, Congress is dominated by
rascally, small-minded men.72
Interestingly, the people responded with a number of novel
ideas such as new political parties and labor unions. The Green-
back Labor Party and the Antimonopoly Party, which supported a
graduated income tax, merged to become the relatively influential
Populist Party.73 The Prohibitionist Party held its fourth national
convention that same year and nominated a candidate for presi-
dent.74 The American Federation of Labor grew out of a national
gathering of unions in 1881, fought for the right to collective bar-
gaining and, by the turn of the century, had half a million mem-
bers. 5 So, although the formal national government seemed mired
in a stalemate, much was transpiring at the populist level.
68 See id.
69 Id.
70 See ALMANAC, supra note 58, at 342. As of April 1880, "[tlhe farmers' plight has
taken on the proportions of catastrophe in the face of high tariffs, flood and drought, unfair
railroad rates and high interest on loans and mortgages." Id.
71 Railroad labor strikes as well as strikes in the mining industry were common in the
late 1870s and severe strikes engulfed the iron and steel industries in the early 1880s. See
id. at 336, 349.
72 Id. at 343.
73 See id. at 353-54.
74 See id. at 355.
75 See id. at 359.
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Democrat Grover Cleveland regained the Presidency in 1892.
He faced a strong movement in both the Democratic and Populist
parties favoring income taxation. 6 Once again, a panic ensued.
The Panic of 1893 witnessed the crash of the New York stock mar-
ket and a massive financial crisis. 7 Unemployment and labor un-
rest were widespread.7
Finally, in August 1894, Congress returned to the income tax
as a source of federal revenue when it enacted the Wilson-Gorman
Tariff Act. 79 The 1894 federal income tax was directed at taxing
only those with vast accumulations of wealth. 0 "Census statistics
showed that over 90 percent of the twelve million families of the
country owned less than 30 percent of the national wealth,"81
while the other 10% of the families owned more than 70% of the
national wealth. The Act imposed a rate of 2% on incomes in ex-
cess of $4000, was scheduled to expire in five years, included gifts
and inheritances as well as the proceeds therefrom as income, and
imposed a separate tax upon corporations, with major categories
of exempt associations.82
The 1894 income tax was cut short by the fascinating decision
of the U.S. Supreme Court in Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust
Co.83 Pollock challenged the constitutionality of the 1894 income
tax by instituting a representative stockholder suit against the
Farmers' Loan and Trust Company, seeking to enjoin the bank
from paying the tax upon his income and the income of various
trusts administered by it.' The Supreme Court permitted a direct
appeal and heard arguments for five days. 5 Historian Lawrence
Friedman notes that the eight sitting justices
held the tax unconstitutional, but only as it applied to income
derived from real estate. On the big question, whether the
whole law was unconstitutional as a "direct Tax," the Court was
evenly divided, four against four. The ninth judge, Jackson, was
sick. The case was then reargued-with Jackson present-and
this time the Court declared the whole law void, by a bare ma-
jority, 5-4.86
76 See PAUL, supra note 12, at 34.
77 See ALMANAC, supra note 58, at 376. The Silver Purchase Act had badly drained
gold reserves. See id.
78 See id. at 376-78.
79 See id. at 379.
8o The 1880s and 1890s witnessed massive accumulations of wealth in oil, copper,
steel, tobacco, and sugar trusts. See id. at 350.
81 PAUL, supra note 12, at 39.
82 See STANLEY, supra note 12, at 132.
83 Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895); Pollock v. Farmers' Loan
& Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601 (1895).
84 See PAUL, supra note 12, at 40. Pollock owned only 10 shares of stock. See id.
85 See id. at 40-41.
86 FRIEDMAN, supra note 34, at 566.
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It is important to note that, during the 40-year period from
1860 to 1900, 14 million immigrants came to the United States.87
The face of America was changing dramatically, and urbanization
was in full swing. In addition, the antics of the Republicans and
the Democrats a century ago seem painfully reminiscent of the
political polarization of today. While the Republicans insisted
upon the continuance of the tariff system, severely penalizing the
poor for consumption of basic goods, massive wealth accumulated
in a small percentage of the population. The distance between
economic classes of citizens became even greater. Professor Stan-
ley summarizes this period as follows:
[i]ncome taxation had existed as a symbol of the taxation of ac-
cumulated wealth, offering the illusion of a significant contribu-
tion toward the overall revenues, and thereby of the potential
easing of the cost of living through reductions made possible in
the consumption schedules of the tariff. It spoke powerfully to
the ability of the Congress to reach especially the pockets of
those whose income was not "earned," but existed in invest-
ments. The Fuller opinion had specifically prohibited the unap-
portioned taxation of the most visible, most powerful, most
"unearned" income in the nation, thereby wholly compromising
the claims to tapping wealth which the Congress might make
and ending the law's utility as a pacifier of class animosity.
Worse, the Court had happily permitted, as the dissenters
pointed out, the unapportioned taxation of "earned" income,
that from salaries, professions, and other employments. This
was the income of precisely the groups toward whom the sym-
bolism of income taxation was directed: the groups who most
needed assurance that the system was, indeed, a fair one."8
4. The Early 1900s
In the wake of the Panic of 1907, caused by a shortage of cur-
rency from reckless over-capitalization of new enterprises, 9 Con-
gress was forced to make a choice. In 1909, President Taft offered
a compromise solution to the congressional debate over new
When the Court is evenly divided, by custom it does not reveal who voted on which
side. When the case was reargued, Jackson, the missing judge, voted to uphold
the act. This should have given the law a 5-4 majority; in fact it lost by 5-4. There
is a minor historical mystery here, since one of the other four judges in the major-
ity must have changed his mind between the time of the two votes. No one is quite
sure which judge is the guilty one.
Id. at n.81. See also PAUL, supra note 12, at 214-17.
87 See ALMANAC, supra note 58, at 351.
88 STANLEY, supra note 12, at 177.
89 See ALMANAC, supra note 58, at 414. Professor Stanley observes about the Panic of
1907: "In terms of severity, the depression ranks sixth of fifteen depressions and recessions
measured by the average percentage decrease in indexes including imports, clearings, pig-
iron production, cotton consumption, railway revenue, and coal production." STANLEY,
supra note 12, at 184 n.6.
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sources of federal revenue. The President made two proposals
that ultimately were accepted by Congress: first, an amendment
to the Constitution regarding a federal income tax to be submitted
to the States; and second, a 2% excise tax on net corporate
income.9°
Between 1909 and 1913, 42 of the 48 states approved the 16th
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.91 On February 25, 1913, the
16th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution became law:
92
[tihe Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on in-
comes, from whatever source derived, without apportionment
among the several States, and without regard to any census or
enumeration.
As Professor Stanley points out, the states had little reason to
oppose the Amendment. Most of the states already had turned to
either the inheritance tax or the income tax at the state level, tax-
ing accumulated wealth by the use of low progressive rates and
high exemptions. Thus adoption of the measure addressed "class
anxiety."93
In addition, the states were possibly operating under their
own paradigm when it came to the income tax. Although the
Amendment clearly stated that Congress would have the power to
tax "income, from whatever source derived," it is doubtful that any
of the state legislators ever envisioned the imposition of the in-
come tax upon more than 1% of the population-the "excessively
wealthy"-since that is the only population that had ever been
taxed in the past. As we are all painfully aware, that is not how
the Amendment unfolded over time.
5. The Early Years of the Internal Revenue Code:
1913-1930s
Just one week after the adoption of the 16th Amendment, the
first Democratic President since Grover Cleveland, Woodrow Wil-
son, was inaugurated. 94 Committed in the campaign of 1912 to
tariff reform, the incoming Democratic leadership, the first with
majorities in the House and the Senate as well as the presidency
90 See PAUL, supra note 12, at 94. The amendment to the Constitution proposal was
overwhelmingly approved by the Senate (77-0) and by the House (318-14, 55 not voting).
See id. at 97. The Payne-Aldrich Bill, authorizing the 2% excise tax on net corporate in-
come, was narrowly approved by both the Senate (47-31) and the House (195-183). See id.
at 96.
91 See STANLEY, supra note 12, at 178. This 88% approval by the States was six states
in excess of the constitutionally required minimum. Of 39 ratifying States for which com-
plete information is available, the mean margin of support in the houses was 94.9% and in
the senates was 89.4%. See id. at 212.
92 See ALMANAC, supra note 58, at 422.
93 See STANLEY, supra note 12, at 178-79.
94 See ALMANAC, supra note 58, at 422-23.
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in 20 years,95 moved quickly to establish its reformist credentials
in the Underwood-Simmons Tariff Act of 1913.96 President Wilson
set about reforming the hitherto intractable tariff and banking
systems.97
On October 3, 1913, Congress enacted the Underwood-Sim-
mons Tariff Act, the first tariff reform since the Civil War.98 The
Act brought down tariff duties on 958 items, including foodstuffs,
clothing and raw material; rates on cotton were cut 50%; and rates
on woolens were cut by more than 50%.99 The Act also introduced
the first post-Amendment federal income tax."° The tax applied to
the income of individuals and corporations, removed the existing
$5000 exemption for corporate taxpayers, applied a $3000 exemp-
tion to the incomes of individuals, and established two rate scales:
a "normal" rate of 1% on taxable income, and an additional tax or
surcharge ranging from 1% to 6% on amounts in excess of
$20,000.101
Contemporary estimates indicated that fewer than 4% of
American families received as much as $3000 in income in 1910.12
Since the tax was imposed upon "taxable income," after taking
certain deductions into account, 10 only 1% of the American public
was actually subject to the tax. Notwithstanding the small pro-
portion of taxpayers, $71 million was collected from this income
tax in 1914, and the amount rose to $80 million in 1915.104 A copy
of the 1913 Federal Income Tax Return is included in the Appen-
dix to this article.
In 1916, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of
the new federal income tax.'0 5 A unanimous Court concluded that
the Amendment granted no new taxing power since none had ever
been taken away; rather, it removed the necessity of subjecting
95 "Democrats outnumbered Republicans by 291 to 128 in the House (with 15 Progres-
sives and an Independent), and 51 to 44 in the Senate (with one Progressive)." Wrrr,
supra note 12, at 76.
96 See STANLEY, supra note 12, at 226.
97 See ALMANAC, supra note 58, at 423.
98 See id. at 424.
99 See id.
oo "At the time the tax was accepted as a natural and inevitable culmination of the
constitutional amendment. It was not deemed as important as the tariff bill itself. The
income tax section occupied only 8 pages of an 814-page report." WrrrE, supra note 12, at
77.
lOl See STANLEY, supra note 12, at 226-27.
102 See id. at 227, n.155.
103 The 1913 Form 1040 Tax Form indicates that six general deductions were available
from gross income: 1) business expenses; 2) interest paid on personal indebtedness (thus
the home mortgage interest deduction was available from the start); 3) national, state,
county, school, and municipal taxes; 4) uncompensated casualty losses; 5) worthless debts;
and 6) depreciation deductions. See Appendix, infra, at 90-93.
1o4 See STANLEY, supra note 12, at 227.
1O5 Brushaber v. Union Pacific Ry. Co., 240 U.S. 1 (1916).
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taxes on income to a threshold inquiry into sources, as in Pollock,
prior to application of the rule of apportionment. °6
Also in 1916, in yet another search for revenue in the face of a
budget deficit of $177 million, 1'0 Congress increased the maximum
income surtax rate from 6% to 13% and enacted a federal estate
tax.108 By 1917, the estate tax rates ranged from .5% on estates
above $50,000 to 10% on estates over $10 million. 109 The enact-
ment of a federal estate tax was the culmination of a grassroots
effort. The ideas of Theodore Roosevelt and a growing class-con-
sciousness persisted in the early 20th century. 110 Income and
wealth disparity was a growing source of social and economic anx-
iety. The federal income tax system, as revised by Congress, of-
fered little to counter this imbalance.
The congressional trend of increasing tax rates had an early
beginning. By 1917, with U.S. involvement in World War I, the
top income tax rate (normal and surcharge combined) reached
67%.11' Just one year later, the top combined rate was increased
to 77%.112 The Revenue Act of 1917 "marked the shift of the fi-
nances of the United States from a base of customs and excises to
one of income taxes." 3 As tax historian John Witte notes:
World War I was a shock to government finances that dramati-
cally and permanently affected the internal revenue system in
the United States. What began as a modest income tax with a
very large exemption, a maximum tax rate of 7 percent, and a
negligible share of revenue expanded in four years to a tax ac-
counting for close to 60 percent of all revenue and having a max-
imum rate of 77 percent.
114
The decade of the 1920s brought an interesting array of tax
legislation to the table. In 1920, there were only 5.5 million taxa-
ble returns for a population of 106 million and an estimated labor
force of 41.7 million."5 The Revenue Act of 1921 limited the tax on
106 See STANLEY, supra note 12, at 228.
107 See WrrrE, supra note 12, at 81.
lo See PAUL, supra note 12, at 107-08. The estate tax was imposed on estates in excess
of $50,000 at rates ranging from 1% to 10% on amounts above $5 million. See id. at 108.
1o9 See WrrrE, supra note 12, at 84-85.
1o See PAUL, supra note 12, at 108.
In 1915 Basil M. Manly, Research Director of the Commission of Industrial Rela-
tions, had given as a cause of industrial unrest the unjust distribution of wealth
and income as represented by the fact that forty-four families in the country pos-
sessed income of at least $50 million a year while the majority of adult, male work-
ers in factories and mines received meager wages of from $10 to $20 a week.
Manly urged an inheritance tax as a check upon the industrial feudalism created
by the fortunes of the Rockefellers, Morgans, Vanderbilts, and Astors.
Id.
ini See id. at 114.
112 See id. at 118.
113 WrrrE, supra note 12, at 84.
114 Id. at 87.
115 See id. at 86.
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net capital gains (on capital assets held for more than two years)
to 12.5%116 but did not provide for any limitation upon the deduc-
tion of capital losses. 117 The Fordney-McCumber flexible tariff act
became law in September 1922, materially increasing rates."8 The
1924 Revenue Act placed the first limitation upon capital losses." 9
By 1925, with the heavy influence of then-Secretary of the Treas-
ury Andrew Mellon, the top income tax rate was dramatically re-
duced to 25%, where it remained until 1932.12°
During the decade of the 1920s, it can be said generally that
the country witnessed a low level of taxation and a period of peace
and prosperity. However, such a statement is deceiving. The low
level of taxation primarily benefited the wealthy since, under the
Mellon Plan approved by Congress, the top rates dropped from
50% to 25%, while the lowest-income taxpayers saw their rates
lowered from 4% to 3%.121 Historian Howard Zinn carefully notes
that prosperity was not experienced equally throughout the
United States:
[ulnemployment was down, from 4,270,000 in 1921 to a little
over 2 million in 1927. The general level of wages for workers
rose... But prosperity was concentrated at the top. While from
1922 to 1929 real wages in manufacturing went up per capita
1.4 percent a year, the holders of common stocks gained 16.4
percent a year. Six million families (42 percent of the total)
made less than $1,000 a year. One-tenth of 1 percent of the
families at the top received as much income as 42 percent of the
families at the bottom, according to a report of the Brookings
Institution. Every year in the 1920s, about 25,000 workers were
killed on the job and 100,000 permanently disabled. Two mil-
lion people in New York City lived in tenements condemned as
firetraps .122
The stock market crash of 1929 is generally attributed to wild
speculation. People were buying securities blindly, with little if
116 "It was believed that this provision would stimulate profit-taking transactions, and
give relief from the hardship involved in a bunching of income where a gain represented an
increase in value accruing over a long period of years." PAUL, supra note 12, at 129. Thus
the preferential treatment for capital gain income has been an integral part of the Code
since 1921. The preference was actually eliminated for a short while by the 1986 Tax Re-
form Act (when overall rates were also drastically reduced to just two brackets of 15% and
28%) but was almost immediately reintroduced in 1990 and retained in 1993 when the top
rate on ordinary income increased to 31%, and again to 36% and 39.6% while the rate of
capital gain income remained at 28%. In 1997, the preference became even more enhanced,
generally dropping the capital gain tax rate to 20%. See infra Part II.A.8.
117 See J. MARTIN BURKE AND MICHAEL K. FRIEL, TAXATION OF INDIVIDUAL INCOME 643,
645 (5th ed. 1998).
118 See PAUL, supra note 12, at 130.
119 See BuRKE & FRIEL, supra note 117, at 646.
120 See GRAETz & SCHENK, supra note 46, at 8.
121 See HOWARD ZINN, A PEOPLE'S HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES: 1492-PRESENT 375
(1995).
122 Id. at 373-74.
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any disclosure. The crash marked the beginning of the Great De-
pression, bringing the entire economy to its knees. Unemploy-
ment reached a peak of 13 million by the end of 1932, and total
wages declined by 60% from their 1929 levels.'23 Again, historian
Howard Zinn notes:
[blut, as John Galbraith says in his study of that event (The
Great Crash), behind that speculation was the fact that "the
economy was fundamentally unsound." He points to very un-
healthy corporate and banking structures, an unsound foreign
trade, much economic misinformation and the "bad distribution
of income" (the highest 5 percent of the population received
about one-third of all personal income).'24
In the 1930s, Congress increased income tax rates, exacerbat-
ing the Great Depression. In addition, with passage of the Smoot-
Hawley Tariff Act of 1930, Congress reinstituted high tariffs,
prompted both by a nostalgic desire to return to the tariff as the
principal source of federal revenue and by an isolationist reaction
to the fallout from World War I.125 By 1932, the Republican major-
ity in Congress, so dominant in the previous decade, was gone. 126
Faced with a mounting federal deficit,'27 Congress increased cor-
porate income tax rates to 14% and upped the surcharge on indi-
viduals to 55%.12s By 1932, there were 2 million taxable federal
income tax returns.129 Beginning with the Revenue Act of 1934,
capital losses could generally only be deducted to the extent of
capital gains, although up to $2000 of any excess capital losses
over gains also could be deducted. 3 ' In 1935, the top individual
income tax rate was increased from 59% to 75% on incomes over
$500,000, and the corporate income tax was graduated, with rates
ranging from 12.5% to 15%. 131 In addition, taxes on inheritances
and gifts were also increased." 2 The most significant tax legisla-
tion of this decade was the enactment of the Social Security Act of
1935 and its 1939 amendment, created to provide a federal retire-
ment, disability, and unemployment insurance system. 13
123 See ALMANAC, supra note 58, at 460.
124 ZINN, supra note 121, at 377.
125 See PAUL, supra note 12, at 163. "The effect of the high tariffs enacted was to make
it impossible for foreign countries to pay their World War I debts and almost completely to
stifle foreign trade." Id.
126 See WITTE, supra note 12, at 97.
127 The deficit was $2.7 billion for 1932. See WITTE, supra note 12, at 96.
128 See id. at 97.
129 See PAUL, supra note 12, at 319.
130 See BuRKE & FRIEL, supra note 117, at 646.
131 See WITTE, supra note 12, at 101.
132 See ALMANAC, supra note 58, at 469.
133 See GRAETZ & SCHENK, supra note 46, at 9.
Originally, the Social Security tax rate was set at 1 percent of wages to grow to 5
percent, split evenly between employees and their employers. Today the combined
tax rate on employers and employees exceeds 15 percent and an additional tax of
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Considering the depth of the Depression, it is interesting to
note that neither Congress nor the Roosevelt administration
turned heavily to the federal income tax for a revenue fix.' Mean-
while, labor continued to clamor to be heard and to be seriously
addressed. A million and a half workers in different industries
went on strike in 1934.131 In 1936, there were 48 sit-down strikes;
in 1937, there were 477.136 The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938,
which established the 40-hour week and outlawed child labor, ad-
dressed some of the workers' concerns, although the minimum
wage was set at a low twenty-five cents an hour the first year.137
Given these statistics, it may not be surprising that, by 1939, only
5% of the population was subject to the federal income tax.131
6. The "Taxing of the Masses": The Internal Revenue Code
from the 1940s to the Korean War
Revenue Acts in 1941 and 1942 to finance military expendi-
tures during World War II turned the federal income tax into a
mass tax. The 1942 Act carried the total number of income tax
returns to 37 million, of which almost 28 million reflected a tax
liability.139 Including a Victory Tax,140 the top income tax rate in-
creased to 90% and the number of taxpayers increased to 50 mil-
lion.14 ' Tax revenues were expected to increase by $9 billion. 142 Of
crucial significance, the 1942 Act provided that only 50% of long-
term capital gain and loss was to be taken into account in comput-
ing net income.143 The top corporate tax rate rose from 31% to
40%.14
The Current Tax Payment Act of 1943 put wage and salary
earners on a withholding basis of tax collection. 145 The Revenue
Act of 1944 was vetoed by President Roosevelt in February
nearly 3 percent of wages is imposed to pay for hospital insurance under Medicare.
The share of federal revenues supplied by these payroll taxes has grown substan-
tially over time, and they now account for nearly 40 percent of federal revenues.
Id.
134 Several early pieces of New Deal legislation had tax implications. The Agricul-
ture Adjustment Act, for example, included taxes on food processing, and, more
important, the National Industrial Recovery Act levied a 5 percent tax on divi-
dends and revived the wartime excess profits tax at a modest level.
WITTE, supra note 12, at 98.
135 See ZINN, supra note 121, at 386.
136 See id. at 391.
137 See id. at 393-94.
138 See TIMOTHY J. CONLAN ET AL., TAXING CHOICES: THE POLITICS OF TAX REFORM 19
(1990).
139 See PAUL, supra note 12, at 319.
140 The Victory Tax was a 5% tax on all income over $624, to be levied until the war
ended. See ALMANAC, supra note 58, at 490.
141 See PAUL, supra note 12, at 319.
142 See ALMANAC, supra note 58, at 490.
143 See BURKE & FRIEL, supra note 117, at 644.
144 See PAUL, supra note 12, at 319-20.
145 See id. at 348; ALMANAC, supra note 58, at 493.
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1944,146 but Congress overrode the veto later that same month. 147
The Act reduced the Victory Tax rate from 5% to 3%, introduced
several new deductions and exclusions from gross income, pro-
vided numerous benefits for industry, and sent many excise taxes
to new high levels."46 The Individual Income Tax Act of 1944 sim-
plified the income tax for persons with small or moderate in-
comes. 149 The government raised $380 billion between June 30,
1940, and the end of 1945; of this amount, $153 billion, or about
40%, came from income taxes.5 0 At the conclusion of World War
II, the Revenue Act of 1945 reduced the income tax burden consid-
erably-12 million taxpayers were removed from the tax rolls,
revenue from individuals dropped $3.8 billion, and corporations
received a $5.2 billion tax reduction.'
The net impact of these wartime tax acts was dramatic. It
may best be summarized as follows:
[t]he number of personal income tax returns filed almost
doubled between 1940 and 1941, nearly doubled again by 1942,
and then again by 1945. Although marginal rates were raised
to as much as 94 percent in the highest brackets, people of more
modest means bore most of the cost of the new "warfare state."
In 1939 taxpayers with incomes under $3,000 had paid just 10
percent of all income tax revenue. By 1948 they were paying
half.1
2
By 1947, the feared post-war recession had not occurred, and
the federal government actually experienced a surplus. 53 The
quality of life in America, both social and economic, had improved
dramatically in the years between 1939 and 1948."M The Revenue
146 See PAUL, supra note 12, at 371. "This was the first veto of a tax bill in American
history." Id.
147 See id. at 375.
14s See id. at 375-79. The changed excise tax rates alone accounted for an increased
revenue of more than one billion dollars. See id. at 378.
149 See id. at 384-86.
15o See id. at 394.
151 See id. at 420.
152 CoNLAN ET AL., supra note 138, at 18.
153 See PAUL, supra note 12, at 479.
Except for stock market apathy, the year had been a banner year. Industrial pro-
duction, supported by a record money supply, had risen to a peacetime peak.
There had been a boom in exports, a drop in strikes, record corporate profits and
dividends, record farm, professional, and proprietors' income, record wage and sal-
ary income, record employment, and few business failures. Most extraordinary of
all things, there had been at long last a government surplus.
Id.
154 From the middle of 1939 to the middle of 1948 employment had increased 28
percent; the consumer price index for all items more than 70 percent and for food
129 percent; wholesale price indexes 112 percent with agricultural prices in the
vanguard of the advance; weekly earnings in manufacturing 118 percent; the gross
national product in current dollars about 173 percent; manufacturing sales 231
percent; corporate profits after taxes 272 percent.
Id. at 522.
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Act of 1948, enacted over President Truman's veto, provided post-
war tax reductions.'55 It reduced individual income tax rates at all
levels,'56 increased exemption levels,157 and instituted the joint in-
come tax return for married couples. 151 In addition, the Act intro-
duced the marital deduction into the estate and gift tax system.'59
Congress increased the individual income tax to finance the
Korean War. 6 ° By 1950, as much as 59% of the population was
subject to the individual income tax and 45% of all federal receipts
were from the individual income tax.'6 ' In 1951, 90 million federal
income tax returns were filed.162 The Revenue Act of 1951 trans-
formed the preference for capital gains into a deduction from gross
income equal to 50% of the net capital gain for the taxable year.'63
7. The 32-Year Reign of the 1954 Code
The Eisenhower administration was effective in shepherding
the passage of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.184 The new
Code extended the 52% corporate income tax rate and enacted nu-
merous revenue-losing provisions that provided benefits to a wide
155 See id. at 493-94. According to Randolph Paul, the breakdown of federal estimated
primary sources of revenue in 1948 was:
Revenue
Individual income tax $18.4 billion 46%
Corporate taxes $8.2 billion 21%
Excise taxes (50) $6 billion 15%
Estate & gift taxes $730 million 1.8%
Customs $517 million 1.3%
Id. at 437.
156 "Before its enactment the actual tax rate started at 19 percent for taxable incomes
under $2,000 and increased to 86.5 percent for incomes over $200,000. Under the 1948 act
the actual rates ranged from 16.6 percent to 82.1 percent with a maximum effective rate
limitation of 77 percent." Id. at 494.
157 See id.
158 See id. at 496.
159 See id. at 497.
16o The 1950 tax legislation increased individual and corporate tax rates, closed some
tax avoidance opportunities in the area of capital gains, and amended estate and gift tax
provisions. See id. at 567-70. The 1951 tax legislation slightly increased the capital gains
tax rate from 25% to 26%; allowed the gain from the sale or exchange of a personal resi-
dence to be offset by the cost of purchase or construction of a replacement residence; and
raised corporate income taxes to a new high. See id. at 622-23. Regarding the 1951 tax
legislation, John Witte observes: "Most important, however, a veritable landslide of special
provisions were enacted aiding a wide range of groups." WTTE, supra note 12, at 142.
161 See CONLAN ET AL., supra note 138, at 19.
162 See PAUL, supra note 12, at 319.
163 See BURKE & FRIEL, supra note 117, at 644.
164 See WITTE, supra note 12, at 146.
[S]taff members from Treasury, the Joint Committee on Taxation, the House Of-
fice of Legislative Counsel, and the Office of the Chief Counsel of the Internal Rev-
enue Service ... were given the responsibility for proposing technical and policy
changes and were in constant contact with executive agencies, outside groups, and
the staffs of Ways and Means and Finance.
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range of groups and individuals. 6 ' Eight years passed before an-
other significant piece of tax legislation became law. Revisions en-
acted in the Revenue Act of 1962166 and the Revenue Act of 1964167
significantly reduced taxes and "both the rhetoric and the results
were extremely favorable to capital formation and business. The
1969 Tax Reform Act reversed this bias."1'
President Johnson's Great Society and the Vietnam War 169
combined to influence the 1969 tax legislation, "the most liberal
peacetime tax bill ever enacted."7 ° Revenue-gaining provisions ex-
ceeded revenue loss provisions for both individual income taxpay-
ers and corporations. 71 However, despite its "reform" label, the
legislation did little to simplify or streamline the basic structure of
the income tax system. 72 As Professor Witte shrewdly observes:
[flinally, even though the Tax Reform Act of 1969 was the only
major postwar tax bill that increased revenue (at least in its
first year), it still provides evidence for the bias of tax politics in
favor of tax reduction. The country was in the middle of a war,
deficits had been persistent for years, inflation was becoming a
continuous concern, and the political mood favored closing loop-
holes and tax shelters and taxing corporations and the wealthy.
And it still took three years of planning and pressure and finally
a well-publicized attack on a few people able to avoid taxation
completely to stimulate the enactment of reforms. Even then,
the provisions were mostly patchwork rules that did nothing to
alter the underlying laws that served as a foundation for abuse.
At the same time, five new tax expenditure provisions were cre-
ated to further politically acceptable goals of the time. In the
165 Id.
166 The Revenue Act of 1962 instituted the investment tax credit, revised depreciation
schedules, and imposed restrictions upon certain business deductions. See WiTTE, supra
note 12, at 156-58.
167 Rates were reduced, particularly for the income groups below $5000; new provi-
sions were added such as moving expense deductions, income averaging, minimum stan-
dard deduction, and capital gains exclusion on the sale of a residence by the elderly; and
many more provisions were liberalized. See id. at 165. "As finally enacted, the legislation
offered a 20 percent tax reduction for individuals and corporations, bringing the top per-
sonal income bracket down from 91 percent to 70 percent and lowering the bottom rate
from 20 percent to 14 percent." CONLAN ET AL., supra note 138, at 21-22.
168 WrrrE, supra note 12, at 172.
169 President Johnson's Great Society and War on Poverty policies were implemented
through the creation of the Office of Economic Opportunity and the successful push for
enactment of the Civil Rights Act, the Voting Rights Act, Medicare, and the Water Quality
Act. However, the President's continued support of U.S. involvement in Vietnam and the
heavy financial demands of the war diverted funds away from these domestic goals. See
ALMANAc, supra note 58, at 568.
170 WrrrE, supra note 12, at 173.
171 See id. at 171 tbl.8.2.
172 In a section entitled "Lessons of the 1969 Tax Reform Act," John Witte observes:
"Rather than decisive, definitive action to eliminate or curtail basic provisions that erode
the tax base, tax reform, true to the incremental approach, often becomes a matter of ad-
justment and counteradjustment in a cat and mouse game played between clever govern-
ment experts and tax lawyers." Id. at 173.
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end, only a strong threat of veto and Treasury's careful monitor-
ing of Conference Committee actions prevented a bill that would
have meant substantial tax reduction.173
By 1970, 81% of the population was subject to the individual
income tax.174 Inflation was the driving force behind enactment of
the Tax Reduction Act of 1971. Upon enactment, the bill was pre-
dicted to reduce revenue by $25.9 billion over three years and its
major provisions strongly favored business by reinstating the in-
vestment tax credit and initiating a more rapid system of depreci-
ation known as Asset Depreciation Range (ADR).17 5
The 1970s were tumultuous years. Just a smattering of
events are referenced to provide a cultural perspective for this
time. In just the first few years of the decade, for example, the
last U.S. ground forces were withdrawn from Vietnam in 1972 but
bombings continued;17 busing to achieve school integration was a
divisive issue;17 the 1973 landmark decision of Roe v. Wade held
all state laws that prohibit voluntary abortions before the third
month unconstitutional; 17 and the Watergate break-in and ensu-
ing cover-up led to the conviction of six defendants in 1973, plus,
in 1974, the unprecedented resignation of a President and the con-
viction of many of his White House staff members.'79 Voters were
registering general disillusionment.5 °
By 1975, the country was in the grips of a steep reces-
sion.8 1As historian Howard Zinn notes:
[tihe Census Bureau reported that from 1974 to 1975 the
number of Americans "legally" poor (that is, below an income of
$5,500) had risen 10 percent and was now 25.9 million people.
Also, the unemployment rate, which had been 5.6 percent in
1974, had risen to 8.3 percent in 1975, and the number of people
who exhausted their unemployment benefits increased from 2
million in 1974 to 4.3 million in 1975.182
173 Id. at 174-75.
174 See CoNLAN FT AL., supra note 138, at 19.
175 See Wrrrm, supra note 12, at 176-79.
176 See ALMANAC, supra note 58, at 592-93.
177 In 1972 George Wallace ran an impressive race for the Democratic nomination,
in part, because of the stress he placed on the busing issue... Boston, Massachu-
setts (1974) and Louisville, Kentucky (1975) were the scenes of bloody confronta-
tions when busing plans were implemented in those cities.... By 1976 17,216
white students had left the Boston public schools either for the suburbs or for pri-
vate schools.
Id. at 588.
178 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
179 See ALMANAC, supra note 58, at 597-99.
18o In 1960, 63% of those eligible to vote voted in the presidential election. By 1976,
this figure had dropped to 53%. See ZNN, supra note 121, at 551. Some of this decline may
be attributable to the passage of the 26th Amendment in 1971.
181 See WrrrE, supra note 12, at 183.
182 ZnN, supra note 121, at 545-46.
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Amazingly, the next four years, 1975 through 1978, witnessed
annual enactments of tax reduction legislation. Income taxes
were again reduced to stimulate a lagging economy with minor
Code changes in the Tax Reduction Act of 1975183 and massive
changes in the Tax Reform Act of 1976.184 Most of the 1976 reve-
nue-gaining provisions (30 changes) affected primarily high-in-
come groups while the revenue-losing provisions (20 changes),
with the major exception of the extension of the investment credit,
primarily benefited those in the lower-income category.
18 5
The 1977 Tax Reduction and Simplification Act did reduce
taxes8 6 but accomplished little to simplify the growing complexity
of the Code.'87 The 1978 Revenue Act reduced taxes across all in-
come levels, but the highest-income taxpayers benefited the
most. 88 Thus the 1978 tax legislation marked the beginning of a
congressional trend to shift the overall burden of the income tax
from the wealthy to the poor, at a time when the skewed distribu-
tion of wealth in the country had reached startling proportions.'89
183 See WrrIE, supra note 12, at 182-87. One new provision in the 1975 tax-reduction
legislation that turned out to be quite significant was the earned income credit. Primarily
enacted to provide low-income taxpayers with relief from the growing, regressive effect of
Social Security taxes, I.R.C. § 32 has been amended over the years (in 1978, 1980, 1984,
1986, 1990, 1993, and 1996) to now serve as a substantial mechanism for assistance to the
poor. See Michael J. Caballero, The Earned Income Credit: The Poverty Program That Is
Too Popular, 48 TAx LAw. 435 (1995); George K. Yin et al., Improving the Delivery of Bene-
fits to the Working Poor: Proposals to Reform the Earned Income Tax Credit Program, 11
Am. J. TAX POL'Y 225 (1994); and Sharon C. Nantell, The Tax Paradigm of Child Care:
Shifting Attitudes Toward a Private/Parental/Public Alliance, 80 MARQ. L. REv. 879, 962-
64 (1997).
184 See WIrE, supra note 12, at 195. "[Rleduction was estimated at $15.7 billion for
fiscal year 1977 and $11.6 billion for 1978. Of that amount, most came from the extension
of the general tax credit and the lowered standard deduction." Id.
1s5 See id. at 196.
186 "Mhe estimated reduction in the bill was approximately $11 billion in fiscal year
1978." Id. at 202.
187 The New Jobs Tax Credit instituted in this legislation was intended to accomplish a
simple purpose: to provide a wage tax credit to induce new employment. Ironically, its
language was exceedingly and intentionally complicated, to prevent unfair advantages by
either particular businesses or tax conscious employers in general. See id. at 203-04.
1s Compared with existing law, the largest cuts in terms of percentages went to
those with incomes under $10,000 (since they initially paid very low taxes). How-
ever, unlike earlier tax cuts, this one gave all income groups above that level a cut
close to the same percentage (around 6.8 percent), with those above $20,000 actu-
ally receiving higher percentage reductions than those between $10,000 and
$20,000. In absolute dollar terms those in the higher-income groups received
much more. Of the total cut, 67 percent went to the 21 percent of the taxpayers
who had incomes over $20,000.
Id. at 213.
189 The fundamental facts of maldistribution of wealth in America were clearly not
going to be affected by Carter's policies, any more than by previous administra-
tions, whether conservative or liberal. According to Andrew Zimbalist, an Ameri-
can economist writing in Le Monde Diplomatique in 1977, the top 10 percent of the
American population had an income thirty times that of the bottom tenth; the top
1 percent of the nation owned 33 percent of the wealth. The richest 5 percent
owned 83 percent of the personally owned corporate stock. The one hundred larg-
est corporations (despite the graduated income tax that misled people into think-
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In addition, the 50% deduction from gross income for net capital
gains was increased to 60% and remained at that level until
1986.190 It must be noted that, during this extended period of "tax
reduction," Congress did not actually need to enact new tax legis-
lation to increase federal revenue since steadily rising incomes
moved individuals and families into higher tax brackets. 9'
No less than six major tax bills were enacted during the
1980s. Championed by President Reagan and Republican Senator
Roth (Del.) and Representative Kemp (N.Y.), 192 the Economic Re-
covery Tax Act of 1981 provided the largest tax reduction in the
nation's history.193 It reduced the top marginal tax rate for individ-
uals from 70% to 50%, added eight new tax expenditure items,
and reduced the projected share of federal revenue from corpora-
tions from approximately 13% in 1981 to less than 7% by 1986.194
However, the drastic tax reduction caused the federal deficit to
climb from $79 billion in 1981 to $128 billion in 1982, and up to
nearly $208 billion in 1983.195
In addition to the deficit woes, the statistics for 1982 were
alarming: Census Bureau statistics revealed the U.S. poverty rate
to be at 14%, the highest rate since 1967 and a 7.4% increase over
1980; the Labor Department reported a projected 6% rise in the
cost of living over a 12-month period, based upon a .5% increase in
October; and Federal Reserve Board figures indicated that the na-
tion's factories were operating at 67.8% capacity, the lowest since
1948, when the Bureau first began to compile such records. 96 Con-
gress responded to this fiscal calamity in 1982 with the Tax Eq-
ing the very rich paid at least 50 percent in taxes) paid an average of 26.9 percent
in taxes, and the leading oil companies paid 5.8 percent in taxes (Internal Revenue
Service figures for 1974). Indeed, 244 individuals who earned over $200,000 paid
no taxes.
ZINN, supra note 121, at 558-59.
190 See BURKE & FRIEL, supra note 117, at 644.
191 In 1965 a family earning the median income was in the 17 percent marginal
tax bracket .... By 1980 a similarly situated family found itself paying income
taxes at the 24 percent rate. For better-off families, those with twice the median
income, the increase was even more pronounced. Their tax rate nearly doubled,
between 22 to 43 percent from 1965 to 1980.
CONLAN ET AL., supra note 138, at 19 (citing JOSEPH J. MINARIK, MAKING TAX CHoICEs 37
tbl.4 (1985)).
192 These three espoused a new tax philosophy, believing that existing marginal tax
rates had greatly depressed incentives to work, save, and invest. These "supply-siders"
argued that high marginal personal income tax rates were the main cause of America's low
productivity growth, economic stagnation, and high inflation. According to their theory, if
tax rates were reduced, real growth would ensue which, in turn, might make the tax reduc-
tion self-financing. Although Congress pursued their theory, recession, not growth, was to
be the consequence. See Marvin A. Chirelstein, Back From the Dead: How President Rea-
gan Saved the Income Tax, 14 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 207, 218-22 (1986); and CONLAN ET AL.,
supra note 138, at 30-35.
193 See CoNLAN ET AL., supra note 138, at 33.
194 See WITrE, supra note 12, at 228-35.
195 See CONLAN ET AL., supra note 138, at 34.
196 See ALMANAC, supra note 58, at 614.
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uity and Fiscal Responsibility Act, the largest peacetime tax
increase in the nation's history (until 1993), and with another in-
crease in the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984,117 restoring annual
amounts of $27 billion and $23 billion, respectively, to the Treas-
ury. 9 ' By 1985, 73% of all federal receipts were from the individ-
ual income tax.199
8. The Internal Revenue Code of 1986 and Its Aftermath
The 1986 overhaul of the Internal Revenue Code2°° reflected
several major and significant shifts in federal tax policy. First,
Congress retreated from the age-old graduated rate structure,
which had grown to 15 brackets ranging from 11% to 50%, to just
two low tax brackets of 15% and 28% by 1988.201 At the same time,
numerous exemptions, credits, and deductions were eliminated,
thus broadening the tax base.20 2 With the significant reduction in
tax rates, Congress decided that the long-standing preferential
treatment for capital gain income could be repealed; thus net capi-
tal gains were now fully included in gross income.20 3 Elimination
of the investment tax credit, long favorable to corporations, as
well as a new corporate minimum tax, caused projected revenue
from the corporate income tax to increase by $120 billion by
1991.204 The irony of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, so close on the
heels of the 1981 Act, was not lost upon historian John Witte:
[iut is also important to note that the least reform-minded bill in
history was the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, which
opened seven new tax expenditures, expanded the benefits of
thirty others, and only tightened up two provisions. Thus, sepa-
rated by only five years, the same president and the same insti-
tutional arrangements produced the historic extremes of tax
reform and anti-reform legislation.20 5
Congress, in the new decade of the 1990s, was faced with a
considerable tax legacy.20 6 In addition, in 1989, President Bush
had vetoed legislation that would have increased the minimum
197 See GRAEz & SCHENK, supra note 46, at 9.
198 See CoNiLN ET AL., supra note 138, at 34.
199 See id. at 19.
200 "The 900-page document altered most provisions of U.S. tax law, creating what is
now rightly named the Internal Revenue Code of 1986." Id. at 1.
201 See id. at 2. The top marginal rate of 28% was an astonishing drop from the top
rate of 70% when President Reagan took office in 1981. See id. at 3.
202 See id. For a detailed listing of the items that were reduced, increased, repealed,
limited or modified, and retained, see id. at 4-5 tbl.1-1.
203 See BuRKE & FRIEL, supra note 117, at 644-45.
204 See CoNLA ET AL., supra note 138, at 6.
205 John F. Witte, Congress and Tax Policy: Problems and Reforms in a Historical Con-
text, 10 Am. J. TAx POL'Y 107, 113 (1992).
206 "As a result of all the tax bills from 1978 to 1990, the net worth of the "Forbes 400,"
chosen as the richest in the country by Forbes Magazine (advertising itself as a "capitalist
tool"), was tripled. About $70 billion a year was lost in government revenue, so that in
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wage from $3.35 to $4.55 per hour, but a few months later signed
a compromise bill that increased the minimum wage to $4.25 per
hour by 1991.207 Tax increases continued in 1990, with the top rate
increased to 31%, and in 1993, with a new top rate of 39.6%,2°s to
combat large federal deficits; however, net capital gains were still
preferentially taxed at only 28%.209 In 1992, 83% of all of the fed-
eral income tax returns filed reflected adjusted gross income below
$50,000.21 0
The transformation of the federal system of taxation from a
tariff and excise tax based system to an income and employment
tax system was startlingly complete. In 1993, the gross collection
of internal revenues by source were:211
In Billions Percentage
Individual income taxes $586 49.7
Employment taxes 412 35.0
Corporate income tax 132 11.2
Excise taxes 35 3.0
Estate & gift taxes 13 1.1
Effective October 1, 1997, the minimum wage was increased
50 cents per hour, to $4.75, and was automatically increased to
$5.15 per hour effective September 1998.212 The Taxpayer Relief
Act of 1997 established a new preferential treatment structure for
net capital gain, providing a 20% maximum rate on certain long-
term capital gains,213 and introduced several new provisions into
the Code.214 The IRS Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998 ad-
dressed concerns with the Internal Revenue Service enforcement
those thirteen years the wealthiest 1 percent of the country gained a trillion dollars." ZINN,
supra note 121, at 568.
207 See ALMANAC, supra note 58, at 629-30. Workers 16-19 years old would be paid only
$3.35 per hour during their training period. See id. at 630.
208 See BURiKE & FRIEL, supra note 117, at 645.
209 See id.
210 See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, ECON. AND STATISTICS ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF COM-
MERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 346 tbl.534 (115th ed. 1995) [herein-
after STATISTICAL ABSTRACT].
211 See id. at 344 tbl.532.
212 See Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-188, 110 Stat. 1755
(1996). See also Paul Richter & James Gerstenzang, Clinton Signs Minimum Wage Hike,
L.A. TIMEs, Aug. 21, 1996, at Al. Prior to the increase, the minimum wage, adjusted for
inflation, had been at its lowest value in 40 years. See id. It had not been raised since
1991. See supra note 207.
213 See BURKE & FRIEL, supra note 117, at 645.
214 Two new provisions were of notable consequence. New Section 121 provided an
exclusion from gross income of up to $500,000 for married taxpayers realizing gain upon
sale of a personal residence. See id. at 99-106. The new Roth IRA provided for nondeduct-
ible contributions with tax-free qualifying distributions. See id. at 132-33.
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policies and procedures. ' Congress and President Clinton are
presently grappling with a phenomenon new to politics in the last
30 years-a projected federal surplus-with Republicans and
Democrats facing off with respective rhetoric of tax reduction or
shoring up the Social Security system.216
B. Values and Beliefs: Historical and Cultural Observations
Our cultural perspective of the federal income tax commenced
with the first element: knowledge. Armed with a basic knowledge
of our tax history, some attention must now be paid to the second
fundamental aspect of culture: values and beliefs. What have we
learned from our quick historical tour? Remember, the premise of
this piece is that how a society chooses to tax itself says something
significant about that society.
The importance of cultural beliefs, as opposed to the primary
focus upon economics, in the development and acceptance of a tax
by a society must be examined. What cultural perspectives do we
employ when assessing the viability of our current federal income
tax, or any alternative tax system? What is our "tax culture?"
This analysis necessitates some reflection upon our values and be-
liefs, as reflected, or perhaps more significantly, as not accurately
reflected, in our current tax code. What follows is a brief and
sometimes unsettling assortment of cultural observations and
conclusions.
1. The Federal Income Tax: Not an Overnight Event
First, and most significantly, our historical review reveals
that the shift from federal reliance upon excise taxes and tariff
duties to the individual income tax as the major source of revenue
was not a wholesale, overnight event. It required nearly a century
for the federal income tax, first imposed upon the wealthiest 1% of
the population in 1913, to evolve into a system of taxation upon us
all. As the need for revenue increased for a multitude of reasons
over the years, Congress gradually shifted away from excise taxes
and tariffs to the income-based system of today.
This observation becomes a crucial factor to consider as we
evaluate proposed alternatives to the current income tax struc-
ture. Too drastic or rapid a change to an alternative federal taxa-
tion system could easily meet with fear, resistance, and distrust in
the general population '-a sense of culture shock. How funda-
215 See generally CCH, 1998 TAX LEGISLATION: LAw, EXPLANATION AND ANALYSIS: IRS
RESTRUCTURING AND REFORM ACT OF 1998 (1998).
216 See Alissa J. Rubin, Clinton to Propose Tax Breaks to Aid Domestic Agenda. L.A.
TmEs, Jan. 19, 1999, at Al.
217 Remember the Whiskey Rebellion of 1794. See supra notes 23-25 and accompany-
ing text.
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mental a change the American public will tolerate is unknown.
Our historical perspective indicates, however, that an overnight
overhaul of the federal income tax system to a consumption-based
system of taxation, for example, would not be a likely event.
2. The Legacy of Tax Laws by and for Wealthy
White Males
Our tax system, much like the rest of our law, was created by
mostly wealthy, mostly male, mostly white individuals. Just a few
examples and statistics adequately support this observation.
Most of us are aware of the fact that the early Framers of the
Constitution were wealthy, white male landowners.21 s More than
100 years later, wealthy white males were still a dominant force
in shaping law in the United States. In 1909, for example, 23 of
the 80 U.S. Senators were millionaires.219 This was at the time
when Congress could not agree upon an income tax (as then pro-
posed, to be imposed only upon the wealthiest 1% of the popula-
tion) and President Taft ultimately had to recommend that a
constitutional amendment be submitted to the States.22 ° It was
also at the time when fewer than 4% of American families received
as much as $3000 per year in income. 221 Another notable example
of the influence of wealth upon the creation of our tax laws is the
fact that, during the presidencies of Harding and Coolidge, An-
drew Mellon, one of the richest men in America, served as the Sec-
retary of the Treasury.222 Noted. historian Morton J. Horwitz
contends that, as far back as 1895, poignantly illustrated by the
218 Historian Howard Zinn notes several observations made in the early 20th century
by historian Charles Beard (in CHARLES A. BEARD, AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE
CONSTITUTION (1935)):
In short, Beard said, the rich must, in their own interest, either control the gov-
ernment directly or control the laws by which government operates. Beard applied
this general idea to the Constitution, by studying the economic backgrounds and
political ideas of the fifty-five men who gathered in Philadelphia in 1787 to draw
up the Constitution. He found that a majority of them were lawyers by profession,
that most of them were men of wealth, in land, slaves, manufacturing, or shipping,
that half of them had money loaned out at interest, and that forty of the fifty-five
held government bonds, according to the records of the Treasury Department.
Thus, Beard found that most of the makers of the Constitution had some direct
economic interest in establishing a strong federal government: the manufacturers
needed protective tariffs; the moneylenders wanted to stop the use of paper money
to pay off debts; the land speculators wanted protection as they invaded Indian
lands; slaveowners needed federal security against slave revolts and runaways;
bondholders wanted a government able to raise money by nationwide taxation, to
pay off those bonds. Four groups, Beard noted, were not represented in the Consti-
tutional Convention: slaves, indentured servants, women, men without property.
And so the Constitution did not reflect the interests of those groups.
ZiNN, supra note 121, at 89-90.
219 See PAUL, supra note 12, at 94.
220 See supra Part II.A.4.
221 See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
222 See ZNN, supra note 120-121, at 375. For a discussion of the Mellon Plan adopted
by Congress in 1925, see supra footnotes 121-22 and accompanying text.
A Cultural Perspective
Supreme Court's decision in Pollock,223 the country was committed
"to a neutral, non-redistributive state."224
No woman served in the House of Representatives until Jea-
nette Rankin of Montana was elected in November 1916.225 In the
105th Congress (1997-1998), only nine of the 100 Senators and
only 54 of the 435 Representatives (12.4%) were women.226 Of the
63 women serving in Congress in 1998, 17 (27%) were women of
color.227 Seven states have never sent a woman to either the Sen-
ate or the House.228 Jennifer Dunn (R-Wash.) is only the fifth wo-
man ever to serve on the Ways and Means Committee of the
House of Representatives.229
The historical statistics for the U.S. Supreme Court and the
presidency are dismal for both female and minority representa-
tion. Of the 113 Supreme Court Justices who have interpreted
our laws for the past two centuries, only two have been women
and two racial minorities. 230 No woman or minority has ever
served as either President or Vice President in our nation's
history.23'
The data confirm that wealthy, white males have dominated
the creation and interpretation of our laws, including our tax
laws. The question becomes, is this bad per se? The answer is
"yes," for not all of their assumptions about American values and
behavior are necessarily reflective of a primarily middle- and
lower-class, two-gender, multi-ethnic society. Our historical sur-
vey has revealed that we have, over the years, selected a shifting
balance and niixture of tariffs, excise taxes, corporate taxes, indi-
vidual income taxes, and estate and gift taxes. This mixture has
reflected a general "tax the lower classes" attitude-first evident
with the Federalist excise taxes, then continued with over a cen-
tury of oppressive tariff duties, and finally reflected today in our
income tax system. Such an observation is undoubtedly not
223 Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601 (1895). See supra Part II.A.3.
for a discussion of this case.
224 MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW: 1870-1960, at 16
(1992). For a thoughtful discussion of the case and its legacy, see id. at 19-27.
225 See ALMANAC, supra note 58, at 431.
226 See CENTER FOR THE AMERICAN WOMAN AND POLITICS (CAWP), NATIONAL INFORMA-
TION BANK ON WOMEN IN PUBLIC OFFICE, EAGLETON INSTITUTE OF POLITICS, RUTGERS UNI-
VERSITY, WOMEN WHO WILL SERVE IN THE 106TH CONGRESS (1998).
227 See id. One African American woman served in the Senate, while eleven African
American women, one Asian American/Pacific Islander, and four Latinas served in the
House. See id.
228 Alaska, Delaware, Iowa, Mississippi, New Hampshire, Vermont, and Wisconsin.
See id.
229 See Robert A. Rosenblatt, Securing the Future for Women, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 27,
1999, at El.
230 Sandra Day O'Connor was appointed to the Court in 1981, Ruth Bader Ginsburg in
1993, Thurgood Marshall in 1967, and Clarence Thomas in 1991. THE WORLD ALMANAC
AND BOOK OF FACTS 1998, at 89 (1997).
231 See id. at 479-80.
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unique to societies today, but it is a sad observation for our demo-
cratic society.
Our differentiation of income as either "earned" and
"unearned" reflects our conflicting attitude toward how wealth is
obtained. Income is clearly a matter of what is valued in the mar-
ket-in our society. The professional athlete, for example, earns
far more than the professional teacher.232 That fact alone says
something about us as a society. Labor has, historically, been un-
dervalued in our society. We espouse to a strong work ethic, but
employees are generally paid as little as the market will bear. As
Professor Kornhauser observes:
American attitudes about money, spending, and wealth are
complicated because money and wealth are not mere commodi-
ties. They also signify deep-seated, complex values and beliefs
about morality, equality, and the American system of govern-
ment. The basic traditions of the United States extol individual-
ism and the sacred right to property while simultaneously
proclaiming the equality of man and government by and for
equals. The former concepts inevitably result in unequal accu-
mulations of wealth, while the latter argue for a more equal
distribution.233
What could be added to the debate with more representative
governmental participants in the decision-making process? A fem-
inist vision of humanity, for example, would contend that "a sense
of connectedness with and obligation to others is an intrinsic part
of the nature of the individual. Such a view of humanity naturally
supports a redistributive progressive income tax."234 Gender bias
throughout the Code has marginalized women and negatively im-
pacted the family.235 However, commentators over the last 25
years have been largely unsuccessful in effectuating any signifi-
cant change in the Code due primarily, in my opinion, to the fact
232 "People rarely appreciate the degree to which wealth is a psychological phenome-
non. The value of assets depends on what we believe is going to happen in the future....
Because wealth is a phenomenon of expectations and beliefs, it is also a function of infor-
mation." Bradford, supra note 10, at 22.
233 Marjorie E. Kornhauser, The Morality of Money: American Attitudes Toward
Wealth and the Income Tax, 70 IND. L.J. 119, 120 (1994).
234 Marjorie E. Kornhauser, The Rhetoric of the Anti-Progressive Income Tax Move-
ment: A Typical Male Reaction, 86 MICH. L. REv. 465, 506 (1987).
235 See, for example, EDWARD J. MCCAFFERY, TAXING WOMEN (1997); Alice Kessler-Har-
ris, "A Principle of Law but not of Justice:• Men, Women and Income Taxes in the United
States 1913-1948, 6 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN's STUD. 331 (1997); Edward J. McCaffery,
Taxation and the Family: A Fresh Look at Behavioral Gender Biases in the Code, 40 UCLA
L. REv. 983 (1993); Nancy E. Dowd, Work and Family: Restructuring the Workplace, 32
ARIz. L. REV. 431 (1990); Pamela B. Gann, Abandoning Marital Status as a Factor in Allo-
cating Income Tax Burdens, 59 TEx. L. REv. 1 (1980); Michael J. McIntyre & Oliver Old-
man, Taxation of the Family in a Comprehensive and Simplified Income Tax, 90 HARV. L.
REV. 1573 (1977); Boris I. Bittker, Federal Income Taxation and the Family, 27 STAN. L.
REV. 1389 (1975); and Grace Blumberg, Sexism in the Code: A Comparative Study of In-
come Taxation of Working Wives and Mothers, 21 BUFF. L. REV. 49 (1972).
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that male legislators have little motivation to revise the laws
against their interest.
The most glaring consequence of a system of tax laws created
by and for wealthy, white males, however, is the exacerbation of"a
growing gap in the relative economic positions between rich and
poor, the latter disproportionately represented by women, chil-
dren and people of color."2 36 Tax provisions such as the home mort-
gage interest deduction and the preferential tax treatment for
capital gains primarily benefit taxpayers in the upper-income
brackets. As Professor Shurtz notes:
[tihe disparity in property ownership between white and black
people, in concert with numerous tax provisions granting
favorable treatment to property owners, such as the untaxed
gains on appreciated (but unrealized) assets such as stocks, or
on inherited property that acquires a step up in basis but is un-
taxed, I.R.C. §1014 (1994), has underscored an unwritten but
real class and race bias embedded in our tax laws.2 37
To support the contention that we are, after 200 years of
struggle, very much a society of rich and poor, I offer data regard-
ing the top 1% of the population by income class. From 1977 to
1989, the income of the top 1% increased by 80.3%, while the in-
come of all families increased by only 15.5%; the income of the
lowest 40% of American families actually decreased during this
period.' In 1992, the top 1% of federal returns included 1.1 mil-
lion filers earning above $181,713 and, although they paid 27.4%
of all taxes, this small group also earned 14.2% of all income.239
Interestingly, the tax rate for these high-income earners actually
declined between 1982 and 1992, from a top rate of 50% to a top
rate of 31%, respectively, but their share of taxes paid increased
substantially, from 19.0% to 27.4%.24' This seemingly incongruous
result came about because high-income taxpayers still reported a
disproportionate share of the total adjusted gross income. While
the top 1% of taxpayers earned 8.9% of income in 1982, they
earned 14.2% of all income in 1992.241 In addition, the reported
income of the top 10% of all income earners rose from 32.3% of the
total in 1982 to 39.2% of the total in 1992.242 Thus, in 1992, 90% of
236 Nancy E. Shurtz, Gender Equity and Tax Policy: The Theory of "Taxing Men," 6 S.
CAL. REV. L. & WoME's STuD. 485, 528 (and accompanying footnotes) (1997).
237 Id. at 528 n.198.
238 See Martin J. McMahon, Jr., Individual Tax Reform for Fairness and Simplicity:
Let Economic Growth Fend for Itself, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 459, 462-63 (citing House
Comm. on Ways and Means, 1992 Overview of Entitlement Programs 1454, at 1511 tbl.15,
1513 tbl.16 (Comm. Print 1992)).
239 See Chris R. Edwards, Who Pays Federal Income Taxes?, 66 TAx NOTES 105 (1995).
240 See id.
241 See id. at 107.
242 See id.
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the taxpaying public was receiving 60% of all income, while 10% of
the taxpaying public was receiving nearly 40% of the income.
Due to the sharp decline in the progressivity of the tax rates 243
and the plethora of tax expenditure items available to upper-in-
come taxpayers, 24  the lower- and middle-classes 245 in America still
bear a substantial portion of the federal income tax burden. In
1996, nearly 22% of the total federal income tax revenue was col-
lected from those taxpayers with adjusted gross incomes below
$50,000.246 Nearly 49% of the total federal income tax revenue was
collected from those taxpayers reporting adjusted gross incomes
below $100,000. Add into this equation the impact of the Social
Security tax, collected on gross wages up to $62,700, and the bur-
den of taxation upon the working class in America is again quite
evident. Taxpayers reporting adjusted gross income of $500,000
or more paid slightly more than 21% of the total federal income
tax burden in 1996.247 These figures lead us directly to the next
observation: the tax expenditure phenomenon.
3. The Tax Expenditure Phenomenon
Since 1913, within the evolving structure of the federal in-
come tax, and beyond the obvious issues of tax rates, we have
made continuous and crucial decisions regarding exemptions, ex-
clusions, capital gains and losses, deductions, and credits. For the
last 30 years, the primary tax policy focus has been upon "tax ex-
penditures"-reductions in individual or corporate income tax lia-
bilities that result from special tax provisions or regulations that
provide tax benefits to particular taxpayers.2" Tax expenditures
243 See supra Part II.A.7. & 8.
244 See infra Part II.B.3.
245 How we define "middle-income" or "middle-class" is problematic. The higher our
income, the greater our tendency to stretch the definition of middle-income to include our
own income. See WITrE, supra note 12, at 340-43.
246 For 1996, $142 billion of the total revenue of $658.2 billion was collected from tax-
payers reporting adjusted gross incomes (AGI) under $50,000. Percentages of total tax col-
lected and total number of returns, by AGI, for 1992 and 1996 are:
1992 1992 1996 1996
% of Total % of Total % of Total % of Total
Adjusted Gross Income Tax Collected Returns Tax Collected Returns
0-$49,999 30.4% 82.80% 21.6% 78.18%
$50,000-$99,999 29.4% 13.89% 27.1% 16.72%
$100,000-$199,999 14.1% 2.47% 16.7% 3.83%
$200,000-$499,999 10.9% .66% 13.3% 1.00%
$500,000-$999,999 5.2% .12% 6.6% .18%
$1,000,000 or more 10.0% .06% 14.7% .09%
See STATISTICS OF INCOME, supra note 8, at 150 tbl.3.
247 See id.
248 Defined in the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974. See
GRAETz & SCHENK, supra note 46, at 44. The "top 10 tax expenditures" of 1995 as esti-
mated by the Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation were:
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purportedly facilitate congressional pursuit of a strong "stimulate
the economy" approach to the Code and tax legislation, encourag-
ing and discouraging specific types of behavior through its coer-
cive and manipulative taxing power. Congress has emphasized
more politically palatable tax subsidies (i.e., tax expenditures)
rather than politically deadly direct subsidies (i.e., welfare).249
The final result is an excessively complex and brutally unfair
system of taxation. As Marvin Chirelstein observes:
[tiax preferences have grown phenomenally since World War II,
and it is not possible today to regard our national tax system as
anything but unfair and unequal in its application. The Inter-
nal Revenue Code contains a multitude of special interest provi-
sions. Some are "industry specific" concessions to big businesses
like extractive industries, defense contractors, and bank and in-
surance companies, while others benefit investors and high-sal-
aried individuals through reduced tax rates on capital gains,
and travel and entertainment expense deductions for executives
and professionals. The ideal of a comprehensive tax base-a tax
on "all income from whatever source derived"-now really ap-
plies only to middle- and lower-income taxpayers who have few
opportunities to exploit the preferences which the Code affords
to others.25°
We, as a society, appear to value the importance of choice and,
as the federal income tax became a tax upon us all, the importance
of individual choice emerged as a prominent aspect of the system.
However, as Professor Chirelstein indicates, the matter of choice
to exploit tax pyeference items in the Code is mostly an illusion for
individual taxpayers Not all tax systems empower; the extent
to which a tax system empowers reflects and implements impor-
tant values. 2 Our current tax system generally grants choices to
In Billions
1. Pensions + IRAs/Keoghs 85.5
2. Mortgage Interest + Property Taxes (homes) 71.3
3. Medical Insurance 50.4
4. Accelerated Depreciation 31.2
5. Charitable Deduction 29.5
6. State & Local Tax Deduction 26.2
7. Social Security (the non-taxable portion of benefits) 24.1
8. Deferral of Gain & Exclusion on Homes 20.4
9. Life Insurance 17.7
10. Medicare 15.3
Id. at 46-47.
249 "[T]ax expenditures make it possible for Congress to give financial aid to specific
groups or industries that could never obtain direct appropriations from the government
because of the public outcry that would arise. Most people, however, do not recognize tax
expenditures as subsidies." THoMAs J. REESE, THE POLITICS OF TAXATION xi (1980).
250 Chirelstein, supra note 192, at 210, and accompanying footnotes.
251 More than 78% of all returns filed in 1996 reflected adjusted gross income below
$50,000. See supra note 246.
252 See Abreu, supra note 4, at 6.
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people who possess material wealth, and it distributes those
choices progressively. 253 Professor Chirelstein adds the following
sobering observation:
the investor class, whether by reason of the tax deferral permit-
ted to real estate owners, or by reason of the capital gain prefer-
ence allowed to security speculators, pays tax at much lower
rates on investment income than do those who receive income
from personal services. From the standpoint of income tax fair-
ness, not the slightest justification can be offered.254
If we are to remain with income as our basic tax structure,
then we must return to a broadened income tax base. This goal is,
obviously, more easily stated than achieved. The primary diffi-
culty now is that we, as a society, have been conditioned into be-
lieving that the Internal Revenue Code, through specific tax
provisions, can be the cure-all for nearly every imaginable social
and economic ill.255 Every candidate for political office, from city
council to President, includes a tax agenda in his or her platform.
Politicians have now maneuvered themselves into a corner. The
elimination of tax preference items would be politically controver-
sial, to say the least, and would undermine the alleged basis for
their very existence: the stimulation of the economy.
4. Americans: A Source of Frustration to Economists
There is much that can be said about American irrationality.
We are an amazing source of contradictory beliefs and irrational
behavior-an economist's nightmare. We loan money to our rela-
tives (with a high probability that we will never see the money
again). We give money to our children with little control over how
they will spend it. We buy items we don't need on the Home Shop-
ping Network®, on credit no less. Sometimes, we even spend
more than we earn.256 Even the renowned tax expert, Boris Bitt-
ker, observes: "I will pursue the road of rationality as far as I can
trace its tracks; but for me, the final destination is not attained
without wandering in the wilderness with only one's soul for
guidance."257
Despite the core principle of raising revenue, however, view-
ing our federal income tax system from a purely economic point of
view results in major flaws in our analysis, for the economist "only
253 See id. at 9.
254 Chirelstein, supra note 192, at 211.
255 See infra Part II.B.6.
256 "For the first time since the Great Depression, Americans spent more money in a
single month than they earned, driving the personal savings rate into the negative zone."
Jonathan Peterson and Stephen Gregory, Personal Savings Rate in Red, 1st Time Since
'30s, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 3, 1998, at Al.
257 CHARLES O. GALviN AND BORIS I. BrrKER, THE INcoME TAX: How PROGRESSIVE
SHOULD IT BE? 28 (1969).
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claims to show us how the world works apart from idiosyncrasies
of time, place, and individual personality."258 We need to recognize
and appreciate cultural as well as economic factors and influences
in our tax Code.259 One consequence of professional economists
holding the high road in tax theory is a general acceptance among
them:
of a certain view of human well being, which translates into as-
sumptions about distributive fairness. Another [consequence] is
the indifference of most tax theory to the admittedly unique as-
pects of the political process through which each country's pecu-
liar tax system is created. This indifference is no doubt a direct
reflection of the way in which economists view their discipline
as a whole. They typically aspire to produce simple, elegant,
strongly explanatory, and in brief, highly general theories of the
phenomenon with which they deal. But a corollary is that cul-
tural, partisan, and irrational elements in actual tax systems
seem to the economist uninteresting and irrelevant. As a result
much of the best work on taxation, done by economists, seems to
pay no attention to how tax policy is made in real life. People
find this apparent lack of realism puzzling. 21
Much has been done to the Internal Revenue Code in the
name of economics. The rapid-fire, massive changes to the Code in
the early 1980s, for example, were prompted by erroneous eco-
nomic theory.26' Our historical survey has repeatedly revealed
congressional tax action to either increase revenue or to reduce
inflation, the federal deficit, or both. Thus, the next observation
must, by necessity, address the political process through which
our country's peculiar tax system is created.
5. The Not-So-Pretty Political Process and the
Congressional Tax Ritual
The political process is not a pretty picture in the context of
tax legislation. Thomas J. Reese observed in 1980 (prior to the
Tax Reform Act of 1986 but still applicable today) that:
258 STEPHEN G. UTz, TAX PoucY: AN INTRODUCTION AND SURVEY OF THE PRINCIPAL DE-
BATES 73 (1993).
259 My sense is that it is probably better to recognize the legitimacy of cultural
factors in tax policy than to treat them as some sort of alien invasion of the econo-
mist's territory. This admission need not lead to an academic retreat, nor to an
easy acceptance of tax subsidies. Because a factor is nonquantifiable does not
mean that it cannot be evaluated. If the cultural value behind a given tax provi-
sion can be identified, the importance of that value can be assessed as well as the
effectiveness of the provision in advancing that value. This process should by no
means replace the economist's art, but it is a vital addition.
Michael Livingston, Risky Business: Economics, Culture and the Taxation of High-Risk Ac-
tivities, 48 TAx L. REV. 163, 229-30 (1993).
260 UTZ, supra note 258, at 71.
261 See supra footnotes 192-95, and accompanying text.
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[tax reformers would prefer to replace this system of high tax
rates and loopholes with a system of lower rates and fewer tax
expenditures. Although the reformers' position is economically
logical, the current system is politically attractive. Politicians
can defend the tax system to poor people by pointing to the
highly progressive rates. At the same time, wealthy and power-
ful interests are not upset because there are loopholes to protect
them. 262
The dynamics of tax policy-making have changed dramati-
cally in the last 20 years. The political reality is that congres-
sional and presidential candidates are elected by an ever-
decreasing percentage of the population willing to vote.263 Those
willing to participate in the election process thus, by default, wield
a significant amount of power. In addition, policy entrepreneurs,
tax experts,264 journalists,265 the media, policy promoters in Wash-
ington think tanks,2"6 and public interest groups267 recently have
been added to the traditional mix of congressional tax committees
in formulating tax policy. 268 Corporate lobbyists, long a political
reality in Washington, are now more organized, and obvious. 9
Additionally, the American two-party political system is at risk of
collapse. 270 As Professor Pollack notes:
262 REESE, supra note 249, at xi.
263 For example, only 44.6% of the more than 190 million Americans eligible to vote in
the 1994 congressional elections actually voted. See STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 210,
at 289 tbl.459.
264 While a generation ago, it was judicial gloss upon the barebone statutes that
added the real substance to the Code, tax laws now are given their substance by
the tax experts in the Treasury Department and Service who issue the regulations
and other published authority that guides the actual practice of tax law.
Sheldon D. Pollack, A New Dynamics of Tax Policy?, 12 AM. J. TAx POL'Y 61, 72-73 (1995).
265 See, e.g., DONALD L. BARTLETT & JAMES B. STEELE, AMERICA: WHAT WENT WRONG?
(1992). The authors, journalists with the Philadelphia Enquirer, wrote this book as an
expanded version of their nine-part newspaper series originally published in 1991. The
book was a best seller.
266 See, e.g., JAMES ALLEN SMITH, THE IDEA BROKERs: THINK TANKS AND THE RISE OF
THE NEW POLICY ELITE (1991). The author notes that: "there is something troubling about
the relationship among experts, leaders, and citizens that tends to make American politics
more polarized, short-sighted, and fragmented-and often less intelligent-than it should
be." Id. at xxi. See also DAVID M. RICCI, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN POLITICS: THE
NEW WASHINGTON AND THE RISE OF THINK TANKS (1993).
267 See, e.g., JEFFREY M. BERRY, LOBBYING FOR THE PEOPLE: THE POLITICAL BEHAVIOR
OF PUBLIC INTEREST GROUPS (1977).
268 See Pollack, supra note 264.
269 See, e.g., JEFFREY H. BIRNBAUM, THE LOBBYISTS: How INFLUENCE PEDDLERS GET
THEIR WAY IN WASHINGTON (1992). The author, a reporter for the Wall Street Journal,
recounts the intense activities of the more than 80,000 corporate lobbyists in Washington
D.C. in the years 1989-1990.
270 Perhaps my prediction of "collapse" is overly influenced by the recent, dishearten-
ing, partisan activity in President Clinton's impeachment proceedings in both the House
and the Senate. However, the general decline in the U.S. political party system has previ-
ously been addressed in JAMES L. SUNDQUIST, DYNAMICS OF THE PARTY SYSTEM: ALIGNMENT
AND REALIGNMENT OF POLITICAL PARTIES IN THE UNITED STATES (1973). See also DAVID S.
BRODER, THE PARTY's OVER: THE FAILURE OF POLITICS IN AMERICA (1971). The Washington
Post correspondent analyzes the polarization of the party system in the two-decade period
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[t]he proliferation of tax policy entrepreneurs and public inter-
est groups reflects the decline of the party hierarchy in Congress
and the weaknesses of the American party system.... In other
words, the erratic course of tax policy during the 1980s was a
product of the continued deterioration in the political process
through which tax policy is made. The unstable political frame-
work and the lack of consensus over tax policy resulted in an
unusually turbulent decade of tax politics. This unstable poli-
tics could produce tax legislation such as Reagan tax cuts in one
year and a tax reform bill such as the 1986 Act only five years
later. Events in the 1990s already suggest that much the same
turbulence continues to haunt federal tax policy."'
John Witte's concerns regarding the course of tax policy after
the Tax Reform Act of 1986, expressed in 1992, hold true today:
[r]egardless of how one evaluates the politics of TRA [Tax Re-
form Act of 1986], two long-standing historical problems with
income tax policy persist despite the changes enacted in 1986.
The first is the continuing possibility that tax expenditures will
again begin to increase, thus narrowing the tax base, increasing
specialized benefits, and further complicating the tax code. De-
spite the landmark nature of the 1986 Act, which eliminated 14
tax expenditures and reduced benefits in 72 other provisions, a
vast array of tax expenditures remain. And since 1986 the only
serious tax proposals have been to restore benefits curtailed by
TRA, e.g., capital gains, IRAs, earned income credit, child care.
In part, the current pressure to expand tax expenditures may be
a cyclical reaction to the severity of the changes enacted in
1986.272
As previously noted, Congress has, as feared, recently expanded
tax expenditures by enacting a 20% tax rate preference for capital
gains, creating a new Roth IRA, and adding other tax expenditure
provisions to the Code.27 3
Although our history reveals that the congressional ritual of
considering new tax legislation is not a recent phenomenon, it has
accelerated in the past three decades to a nearly annual event.
Thus, the public has grown to expect a tax policy position from
every candidate running for public office. Our cultural expecta-
tions now include an annual dose of tax "reform," "reduction," "re-
lief," "recovery," "simplification," "technical correction," or
"restructuring" from an ever more remote, frustrating, and bla-
tantly political process. This reality leads us to a final
observation.
from Eisenhower to Nixon. However, see LARRY J. SABATO, THE PARTY'S JUST BEGUN: SHAP-
ING POLITICAL PARTIES FOR AMERICA'S FUTURE (1988), which provides historical background
and then presents a hopeful agenda for party renewal.
271 Pollack, supra note 264, at 62.
272 Witte, supra note 205, at 113.
273 See supra Part II.A.8. and, in particular, footnote 214 and accompanying text.
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6. The Allegedly All-Purpose, Cure-All Tax Code
History has established that it is often exceedingly difficult
for the political animal that is Congress to accept a major new
concept such as the federal income tax or the Social Security tax.
However, once the idea morphs through the political process and
is finally "put into play" as enacted law, constant congressional
tinkering is the norm. As previously discussed,274 Congress has
modified tax rates, exemption levels, and deductions, and added or
revised a plethora of tax preference provisions to address both
good times and bad, to stimulate the economy or to slow it down,
and to encourage business, investment, home ownership and sav-
ings. The frightening reality of this "reform," "reduction," "relief,"
and "recovery" cycle is that no one really knows whether any of the
tax legislative proposals are capable of remedying the perceived
economic or social crisis of the day. Identifying the parameters of
the current economic or social dilemma, agreeing upon a politi-
cally palatable solution, and predicting the future behavior of 270
million Americans are tasks likely beyond the capabilities of any
group of individuals. The drive to "fix it," however, whatever "it"
might be, through the tax Code is now an innate political instinct
comparable to "survival of the fittest."
The result is that the accelerated rate of recent tax legislation
is nothing short of mind-boggling. For example, the Tax Reform
Act of 1969, which was the first major overhaul of the 1954 Code,
affected only 271 Internal Revenue Code subsections. 5 In com-
parison, the six major tax bills enacted between 1976 and 1984
affected 5815 subsections.2 7 6 And, as previously noted, the recent
Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 alone revised 825 code sections and
added 285 new sections to the Code. 7
I remain unconvinced that the solution to all social and eco-
nomic ills lies in the Internal Revenue Code. Professor Martin J.
McMahon, Jr. observes that:
[tiraditional tax policy analysis focuses on whether the system
(1) raises adequate revenue, (2) in an equitable manner, (3)
without undue complexity, and (4) without undue interference
with the economic system. Since 1981, however, the dominant
characteristic of tax policy debate in the political arena has been
the effect of the current rules and proposed changes on economic
behavior. When tax reform is considered, the focus rarely is on
the tax system as a source of revenues the effectiveness and fair-
274 See supra Part II.A.
275 See Richard L. Doernberg & Fred S. McChesney, On the Accelerating Rate and De-
creasing Durability of Tax Reform, 71 MiNN. L. REV. 913, 922 (1987) (citing Harold Apolin-
sky, The Changes Just Cost Money, WASH. POST, Apr. 6, 1986, at C8).
276 See id.
277 See supra note 7, and accompanying text.
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ness of which should be measured against the full range of
traditional criteria of tax policy. Nor is the redistributive func-
tion of taxation considered in a balanced manner. Use of the tax
system to redistribute the social product has been decried. In-
stead, tax policy analysis has been dominated by demands for
either investment neutrality or investment incentives, with
pseudo-economists somewhat amazingly demanding both simul-
taneously. Advocates of changing the tax system to encourage
economic growth do not seem to view the tax system as a vehicle
to collect adequate revenues fairly or to soften the harsh distri-
butional results that capitalism sometimes produces. They
evaluate the tax system solely as a tool for managing economic
activity, both on a macroeconomic and microeconomic scale. In
other words, much of what passes for "tax policy" in the political
arena today is in reality "tax expenditure policy."27
Is the tax Code tail wagging the economic dog, or vice-versa?
It is exceedingly difficult to tell whether Congress believes that
the economy wags the Internal Revenue Code or the Internal Rev-
enue Code wags the economy. Those on the lower end of the in-
come spectrum are shaking, nonetheless.
C. The Behavior Factor
The third cultural factor to examine in our income tax per-
spective is behavior: how the tax system in obvious as well as hid-
den ways attempts to modify our economic, as well as our
personal, behavior. Volumes could be written about this cultural
and psychological phenomenon, but my discussion shall be re-
stricted to just a few observations.
The first observation of critical significance is that our tax
payments are removed from the behavior that generates the tax
liability and "[tihis behavioral, or functional, separation leads us
to perceive tax payments as punishment for having succeeded fi-
nancially."279 We engage in productive activity that is rewarding
and apparently valued by society and yet, at the same time, we
are "punished," through taxes, the more successful we become.
Thus, observes Professor Rosenberg:
[ulnfortunately, the imposition of occasional punishment in re-
sponse to behavior that is generally positively reinforced has
been shown not only to generate hostility, but also to literally to
[sic] drive subjects crazy. Those who feel they are being pun-
ished tend to retaliate by punishing back, and the one at whom
they tend to direct their punishment is the one they perceive to
278 McMahon, supra note 238, at 461 (and accompanying footnotes).
279 Joshua D. Rosenberg, The Psychology of Taxes: Why They Drive Us Crazy, and How
We Can Make Them Sane, 16 VA. TAx REV. 155, 183 (1996).
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be punishing them; in this case, the perceived punisher[s] are
the Service and taxes in general.28 °
Congress fed into this general hostility toward the Internal
Revenue Service with substantial taxpayer testimony relating in-
stances of IRS taxpayer abuse prior to passage of the 1998 IRS
Restructuring and Reform Act. The irony of this scenario is that
much of the taxpayer hostility was misplaced. Congress creates
the tax laws that punish us and drive us crazy; the IRS is merely
the visible enforcer. How convenient for Congress that a "fall-guy"
was available to receive the taxpayers' wrath.
The second observation is that congressional efforts to alter,
encourage or discourage our behavior through the tax code have
enjoyed varying degrees of success and failure. As Sheldon D. Pol-
lack observes: "[t]he tax laws have a peculiar impact upon private
behavior insofar as they do not strictly prohibit particular private
action or conduct, but rather establish a broad framework of in-
centives and disincentives through which private activity is subtly
altered."28 1 The following four examples illustrate this point.
The first example is savings. Economists generally are in
agreement that Americans need to save more. Changing our in-
come tax system to a consumption tax system, it is argued, would
encourage savings behavior because the funds saved during the
year would not be subject to tax. However, this argument as-
sumes that Americans are at present not saving because the cur-
rent income tax system does not strongly encourage it. Other
than tax-deferred contributions to pension plans, income from
savings is taxed at normal tax rates. However, it might just as
easily be plausible that Americans are not saving because they
can't afford to save-most need their annual incomes just to make
ends meet."2 As previously noted, 78% of all tax returns filed in
1996 reflected AGI of $50,000 or below.283 Taking into account the
federal as well as state income taxes plus the Social Security tax,
this statistic indicates that the majority of Americans are not gen-
erating sufficient income to accommodate savings. The issue is
not so much the income tax as the ability to generate income.
280 Id. at 185-86 and accompanying footnotes.
281 Sheldon D. Pollack, Tax Complexity, Reform, and the Illusions of Tax Simplifica-
tion, 2 GEO. MASON INDEPENDENT L. REV. 319, 357 (1994).
282 [Mlost Americans would have difficulty recognizing the consumption tax as su-
perior in fairness and equity to a broad-based income tax. The reason for this is
that people do not regard saving as an act of self-denial where high-income tax-
payers are concerned, or as mere postponed consumption. In our day at least, sav-
ing generally appears to take place only after all reasonable consumption
preferences have been fully satisfied, and hence sometimes appears to be the ulti-
mate luxury.
Chirelstein, supra note 192, 217-18.
283 See supra note 246.
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The second example is the filing of returns. Filing individual
income tax returns gives us a sense of control, although most of us
need some assistance in completing our returns." There is a
sense of accountability and control that seems important to us.
The cultural phenomenon of filing our returns at midnight on
April 15th is, in my opinion, more than a media event; rather, it
represents a demonstration of individual control over a perceived
tax system gone awry. A negative behavioral consequence of our
self-reporting process, however, is its inherent unreliability.85
A third example is the deadweight loss factor. We spend an
inordinate amount of time, energy, and money attempting to avoid
the imposition of the tax burden. As David Bradford observes:
tax rules impose two sorts of burden. One is the transfer of
purchasing power from the individual to the government; the
other is the effective waste of purchasing power owing to the
distorting effects arising from the effort to avoid tax. The latter
burden, called by economists the "deadweight loss" due to the
tax, represents a gain to no one-neither to other individuals
nor to the government." 6
For illustration purposes, let's examine the situation of a spouse
(the wife, for purposes of this example) who would like to go to
work to supplement the family's income. Due primarily to the So-
cial Security tax and the fact that the wife's income will be added
on top of her husband's income, her additional work income could
actually result in less overall income for the family.287 Numerous
devastating social consequences flow from the spouse's decision
not to work in order to avoid the cascading impact of the taxes:
(1) the loss to the workplace and the community of the skills of
the woman who intelligently decides not to enter the
workforce;
(2) the loss to the woman of her opportunity to pursue her
career;
(3) the loss to the father of time with his family since he must
increase his workplace hours rather than have his wife work
outside the home;
(4) the loss to the children of the father who has less time to
share in their growing up;
(5) the loss to the children of the mother (whether married or
single) who would rather work only part-time but is econom-
ically compelled to work full-time; and
284 See supra note 8.
285 See Rosenberg, supra note 279, at 191. "Self-reporting suffers from an unconscious,
and therefore almost inescapable bias, even in the absence of any deliberate effort by the
taxpayer to cheat or under-report." Id.
286 BRADFORD, supra note 10, at 135.
287 See Nantell, supra note 183, at 894-97.
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(6) the stigma placed upon a poor single parent who intelli-
gently decides to accept welfare rather than a minimum
wage job which cannot provide her and her children with
sufficient resources to cover the necessities of life, including
medical and child care costs.288
Thus, prudent tax avoidance behavior on the part of a taxpayer
results in a multitude of wasted purchasing power-a deadweight
loss.
The final example is home purchases and sales. Nowhere is
the behavioral impact of the tax code more evident than in the
purchase and sale of homes. We often buy homes because we are
motivated to take advantage of the home mortgage interest and
real estate taxes deductions. 8 Prior to the 1997 tax Code
changes, most taxpayers felt compelled under the Code to buy a
home more expensive than the one they sold in order to avoid rec-
ognition of realized gain upon the sale.29°
An inherent flaw in the behavior modification aspect of this
Code section was magnified by experiences in the early 1990s. As
the economy in California declined, many Californians sold their
homes at high prices and moved to states with traditionally lower
home prices such as Colorado291 and Utah.292 The Californians, not
wanting to recognize the gain upon the sale of their California
residences, built and bought expensive homes in their new states,
thus rapidly, and falsely, inflating the value of homes in those
states. By 1995 in Colorado, for example, heavy in-migration to
the state spurred luxury home construction out of a five-year
slump." In Utah, the average home sold for $77,788 in the first
quarter of 1991, the second year that the state began seeing heavy
288 Id. at 896.
289 See I.R.C. §§ 163 and 164 (1994), respectively. These two benefits combined to a
total of $71.3 billion in 1995, thus ranking as the #2 tax expenditure on the "top ten list" for
the year. See supra note 248.
290 See former I.R.C. § 1034 (repealed by the 1997 Taxpayers Relief Act). The impact of
§ 1034 was to defer the reporting of realized gain on the sale of a residence by reducing the
basis of the newly purchased residence. However, in order to qualify for this deferral, the
section mandated that the taxpayer "buy-up"-that is, buy a home more expensive than the
home he or she sold. The deferral of gain upon sale of a personal residence totaled $20.4
billion in 1995, thus ranking it the #8 tax expenditure on the "top ten list" for the year. See
supra note 248.
291 See Guy Kelly, State's Explosive Growth Tapering Off, RocKY MoUNTAIN NEWS, Jan.
29, 1996, at 4A.
292 "At least 37,000 Californians parked their moving vans at Utah's curbs in the first
three years of this decade, according to the best estimates, and they brought more than
their belongings." Colleen Diskin, California Influx Changing the Pace in Laid-Back Utah,
DENVER POST, Jun. 18, 1995, at C7.
293 See Michelle Mahoney, Invasion of the Monster Mansions, DENVER POST, Aug. 2,
1995, at Fl. The managing broker for Devonshire Co. stated: "the home you could buy two
years ago for $500,000 is now $750,000." Id.
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migration from California; but in the first quarter of 1995, the av-
erage house statewide sold for $119,653, a nearly 54% increase.294
Old section 1034 influenced more than just the inflation of
home prices in many states. It also encouraged individuals to in-
vest the gain from the sale of their residences in ever-more-expen-
sive residences, rather than in more productive investments such
as retirement savings, insurance, securities, or bonds.295 The per-
sonal, psychological, social, and economic consequences of these
"misplaced" funds over five decades can hardly be estimated.
Now, the new exclusion from gross income of gain from the
sale of a personal residence, $250,000 for single taxpayers and
$500,000 for married taxpayers,296 is beginning to change property
owners' behavior. It has been estimated that the new tax exclu-
sion could have influenced anywhere from 100,000 to 500,000 of
1998's record 4.8 million resales.297
The end result of a tax policy comprised of motivation-ori-
ented, behavior-altering provisions is an exceedingly complex set
of statutes. Political scientist John Witte observes that "[wihen it
comes to fitting the incentive to a precise type of behavior and pop-
ulation, while at the same time trying to anticipate and thwart
the legal maneuvers of those attempting to exploit the provision,
what may be simple conceptually becomes unmercifully complex
in practice."298 Drafting tax statutes for 270 million Americans,
with the intent of encouraging very specific behavior, is thus
doomed to a fate of intricacies and exceptions-our present, un-
pleasant predicament. Given the fact that no one is actually capa-
ble of predicting the exact behavioral consequences of any one,
specific tax statute, the existence of our current melange of tax
Code provisions is truly frightening.
III. SHIFTING THE INCOME TAx PARADIGM
When the 16th Amendment to the Constitution was approved
by Delaware, the 32nd state, on February 25, 1913, my father was
13 days old. We tend to think that the adoption of the federal
income tax is "ancient history" but, in my family, it is only two
generations old.
294 See Diskin, supra note 292.
295 See Lee A. Sheppard, Should Sales of Personal Residences Be Exempt From Tax?,
50 TAX NoTEs 1433 (1991).
296 See I.R.C. § 121 (West 1988 & Supp. 1999).
297 See Kenneth R. Harney, Tax Law Change Gives Boost to Home Sales, L.A. TIMES,
Jan. 24, 1999, at K1 (Orange County ed.). "The actual cost, at least as measured in new
estimates by the congressional Joint Tax Committee, turns out to be substantial: About $31
billion over the next five years. For home sellers, at least, that's a bipartisan $6 billion a
year they'd never be able to pocket if they paid capital gains taxes on their profits." Id.
298 WrrrE, supra note 12, at 204.
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I believe this observation is important for several reasons.
First, my parents' generation, and every person born after 1913,
has primarily known an income tax system at the federal level.
One would need to talk to centenarians in order to record personal
reflections regarding the prior, longstanding federal tariff
structure.
Second, I believe this observation is important in looking back
on the development of the federal income tax system. Those
men 299 who created and changed the federal tax Code in the subse-
quent decades of the '20s, '30s, and '40s, in particular, were cer-
tainly influenced by the economies and events of their times.
However, they also possessed a personal frame of reference, a per-
sonal historical perspective, of a very different tax structure and
system.
Third, this observation becomes important because our own
personal experiences, our individual historical perspectives, in-
struct, shape, dictate, and, often, constrain our future decisions to
amend or not to amend a system of laws, any laws, whether they
be tax or otherwise.
Nearly every individual living in the United States today has
only known a system of income taxation at the federal level.30 0 It is
an accepted part of our lives and an integral aspect of our culture.
When I ask my Federal Income Tax students why we have an in-
come tax system as opposed to a national sales tax system, for
example, they look at me as if I am from Mars (or is it Venus?).30 1
In their personal historical experiences, sales taxes are the do-
main of state and local governments, as are property taxes. The
income tax system is the only federal tax system they have ever
known. It is their paradigm, and too drastic a change is simply
not trusted as legitimate.
Yet, "Why a federal income tax system?" is the threshold, fun-
damental question to answer if we are to engage in a meaningful
discussion of tax policy. As I have stated, all of our legal rules are
reflections of our values and beliefs,3°" and this statement is cer-
tainly true in our choice of a tax system. 03 As Professor Pollack
observes:
299 The term "men" is used intentionally. See supra Part II.B.2.
300 Certainly immigrants bring their own cultural perspectives regarding taxation
with them. However, once here in the United States, the income and employment tax sys-
tems are the primary federal tax systems they will encounter, and they will encounter
them immediately, with their first paychecks.
301 My apologies to JoHN GRAY, MEN ARE FROM MARS, WOMEN ARE FROM VENUs
(1992).
302 See generally STEVEN J. BURTON, AN INTRODUCTION To LAw AND LEGAL REASONING
(2d ed. 1995).
303 "[T]ax systems are products of human creation. They exist because they serve
human objectives, reflecting the values of their designers. A tax system's design can reveal
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[t]he abandonment of the tariff and the political battle culminat-
ing in the adoption of the federal income tax in 1913 as the new
(and soon-to-be primary) source of revenue proved to be a water-
shed event in the development of public finance, as well as a
milestone in the development of the national political party
system.3"4
This observation leads us to the problem of paradigms. If
things have always been done a certain way-if income has al-
ways been taxed in our personal experiences-then it is so. The
questioning and rationality are often lost in the inevitability of the
answer.0 5 This paradigm phenomenon occurs within tax policy
analysis as well. For example, one of the longstanding tenets of
American tax policy is the supposed necessity of a tax system to
achieve both horizontal and vertical equity.3"6 Under the premise
of horizontal equity, taxpayers with equal incomes should pay an
equal amount of taxes. Lack of horizontal equity is a major criti-
cism of our current tax system. For example, if Taxpayer A has
$50,000 of adjusted gross income and owns a home, then she will
receive the benefits of the home mortgage interest deduction and
the real estate tax deduction in computing her federal income tax
liability. If Taxpayer B has $50,000 of adjusted gross income and
pays rent, however, then she will pay more income tax, since she
will only be able to utilize the lower standard deduction to shelter
her income.
Horizontal equity as an objective of a tax system may have
some fundamental flaws. 07 For example, in our previous example,
is all $50,000 of adjusted gross income created equal? Assume that
Taxpayer A's income came solely from interest and dividends on
investments gifted to her by her grandparents, and then assume
that Taxpayer B's income came from working 60-hour workweeks
at two different jobs. Should the objective of the tax system be to
tax them the same?
Vertical equity necessitates that those taxpayers with more
income should pay a greater share of the tax burden. The theory
is that every added dollar of income means less to a rich person
than to a poor person. These concepts of equity have come to be
an accepted tax policy paradigm of a supposedly neutral system of
much about those values. In other words, our choice of an income tax over a head tax as a
mechanism for raising revenue is not accidental." Abreu, supra note 4, at 16.
304 Pollack, supra note 4, at 496 and accompanying footnotes.
305 The phenomenon reminds me of the old (somewhat sexist) joke about the young
woman who always cut off the end of the roast before putting it in the oven. When her
husband asked her why she did this, she responded, "That is what my mother always did."
The young women then asked her mother why she always cut off the end of the roast before
cooking. Her answer: "Because my pan was too small."
306 See generally GRAETZ & SCHENK, supra note 46; see also CONLAN ET AL., supra note
138, at 26 n.21.
307 See BRADFORD, supra note 10, at 151.
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taxation. However, at their core, such concepts presuppose that
all Americans agree that horizontal and vertical equity in a tax
system epitomize "fairness" and that all of us are in agreement as
to what constitutes "fairness.""'8 Furthermore, why must horizon-
tal and vertical equity be fundamental goals of fairness of the fed-
eral income tax, but not other tax systems such as the sales tax or
Social Security tax?
David F. Bradford concludes that "there is no single measure
of fairness. At bottom, an individual value judgment is involved,
and it is not realistic to hope for complete consensus on a particu-
lar standard. But there is room for reasoned argument on the
subject. °30 9 What specific criteria should we employ to determine
when two individuals have equal circumstances? What judgments
should we make as to which circumstances are better and which
worse, and, further, the degree to which burdens should differ in
the different circumstances? 3 ° Bradford again concludes that "tax
burdens should be related to the quality of individuals' opportuni-
ties. Those with better opportunities than others should be ex-
pected to bear relatively more of the tax burden."31'
We sometimes are successful in making significant changes in
our cultural paradigms. For example, a fundamental tenet of our
society is outright ownership of property. The condominium con-
cept, however, has gradually taken root and gained acceptance,
where individuals do not actually own the structure itself-a com-
munity or association of individual homeowners owns the struc-
ture. The trade-off for nonownership is that the "community" pays
for outside improvements, landscaping, and general maintenance.
There is, apparently, enough of a trade-off to make condominium
ownership an acceptable American choice, and choice becomes the
key ingredient here. For some, the benefit of condominium living
will outweigh the benefit of outright ownership, but, in the end, it
is a matter of choice.
An example of a cultural shift that is not working well, in my
estimation, due to lack of choice, is the health care HMOs. Oper-
ating on the premise of efficient cost management, we are offered
only HMOs as our health care choice. Within the HMO, there is
little choice, and sometimes, limited benefit. Our personal, histor-
ical perspectives tell us that freedom of choice of our physicians
and hospitals is of primary importance. Our HMO experience is to
3o8 For a critical analysis of horizontal and vertical equity, see WrrTT, supra note 12, at
56-58. See also Pollack, supra note 4, at 500-02. For a thoughtful discussion of equity in
general in the context of our federal income tax system, see Joseph T. Sneed, The Criteria
of Federal Income Tax Policy, 17 STAN. L. REV. 567, 574-80 (1965).
309 BRADFORD, supra note 10, at 148.
310 See id. at 151-52.
311 Id. at 148.
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the contrary. Thus, resistance and friction are the norm in the
managed health care field.
312
Choice is a matter of "weighing and balancing." What we are
willing to adjust to that deviates from our personal, historical per-
spectives is largely a matter of weighing and balancing the bene-
fits: what will we gain in exchange for what we have to give up?
Is not this weighing and balancing really the basis of all law?
Are we not willing to drive the speed limit and stop at stop signs
because we believe that the benefits of these rules outweigh the
restrictions upon our individual freedom? Are we not willing to
line up at airports to have our luggage, as well as our bodies,
searched because we believe that the benefit of deterring terror-
ism is worth this amazing amount of infringement upon our pri-
vacy? Our laws reflect our beliefs, and our beliefs are an integral
part of our culture.
One of the problems with weighing and balancing the costs
and benefits of the federal income tax is that the benefits, at least
on a day-to-day basis, are largely invisible to us. In the area of
traffic regulations and airport security, we see and experience the
benefits obtained when we agree to the personal freedom restric-
tions. The income tax system, however, is unique, for its benefits
are removed, both physically and temporally, from its burdens.313
Who or what is benefiting when, for example, an individual has to
pay up to 40% of his or her gross income every month just to fulfill
the obligations of federal and state income tax withholding and
the Social Security and Medicare taxes? Where is all of that
money going?
The larger the community, the more difficult it is to answer
that question. Our community now consists of over 270 million
people.314 Amazingly, 54% of the entire population resides in only
20% of the states. 31 How do we see or experience the benefits of
312 My own personal, historical perspectives may be coming out here. After all, I re-
member when our family doctor, James P. Corrigan, M.D., came to the house on a regular
basis to care for my two sisters and me.
313 See Rosenberg, supra note 279, at 179-83.
Unlike the costs of other laws, the costs of tax payments are neither physically nor
temporally contiguous with any benefit, service or product. While our taxes may
bring us goods and services throughout the year, no one good or service is either
large enough or close enough in time or place to the moment we fill out our tax
returns (or become frustrated with the size of our withholding payments) to hold
our attention.... When we make our tax payments, there is simply no contempo-
raneous or physically proximate governmental benefit with which to associate
those payments.
Id. at 181-82
314 The U.S. population on November 12, 1998 at 4:13:15 A.M. Eastern Time was
270,993,467. U.S. CENSUS BuR- u, THE OFFICIAL STATISTICS (1998).
315 In 1994, the top 10 states in terms of population were: 1) California-31,431,000; 2)
Texas-18,378,000; 3) New York-18,169,000; 4) Florida-13,953,000; 5) Pennsylvania-
12,052,000; 6) llinois-11,752,000; 7) Ohio-11,102,000; 8) Michigan-9,496,000; 9) New
Jersey-7,904,000; and 10) North Carolina-7,070,000. These states totaled 141,307,000
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defense expenditures, Social Security and Medicare costs, and in-
terest payments on the national debt? Yet, 83% of our annual fed-
eral budget outlay is for these three benefits alone.316 Other
benefits such as highway costs over 50 states, agriculture and en-
ergy regulation, the cost of the federal executive, legislative, and
judiciary structures, social welfare costs, and the regulation of the
insurance, food and drug, and security industries are only slightly
more visible.
These are just the tangible benefits; the benefits that an econ-
omist would conclude to be benefits of a tax system. There are,
however, numerous cultural, intangible benefits as well: the sense
of sharing,317 the sense that the community is protecting itself
against possible harm, the sense that we are providing for our eld-
erly and disabled, and the sense that we are making good on our
debts throughout the world. In addition, we have cultural benefits
of choice. We are free to make choices of our sources of income-to
work or to invest-and to pay the consequences of taxation. We
are free to make choices regarding how we spend our money, and
whether the cost will be deductible or not. These are also benefits
that should not be underestimated in evaluating a tax system. 18
Is the perception of who or what is benefiting the same as the
reality? The reason that the answer to this question is so impor-
tant is due to the fact that, even if the perception is wrong, the
perception becomes part of our cultural paradigm. The percep-
tions that tax loopholes keep many rich taxpayers from paying
any taxes at all, or that welfare payments are only to individual
poor people, are part of our belief system. Stating the fact that
very few of the wealthy actually pay no federal income tax, or that
corporate welfare far exceeds individual welfare, does little to al-
of the total population of 260,341,000. See STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 210, at 28
tbl.27.
316 "Out of the total budget dollar about forty-seven percent is expended for social se-
curity, twenty-two percent is for national defense, and fourteen percent is for interest."
Charles 0. Galvin, Past, Present, and Future, 49 SMU L. REv. 83, 93 (1995) (citing the
Economic Report of the President, H.R. Doc. No. 103-178, at 361 (1994)).
317 The creation of a tax system is an imperative of group (i.e., societal) living.
Although tax systems as we now know them did not exist in aboriginal societies,
systems of communal sharing did. Members of numerically small societies share
food, protection from the elements, and defense against predators. The existence
of an organized society implies, by its very definition, the existence of different
roles for different members of it, and the existence of different roles necessitates
sharing. A society in which members are expected to share the proceeds of a hunt
with others is, in effect, imposing a tax upon that hunt .... In the most basic of
senses, then, I heartily agree with Justice Holmes that taxes are the price we pay
for civilization. [citation omitted] Indeed, I might go even further and say that
taxation, that is, the means by which we share resources, is an essential part of
civilization.
Abreu, supra note 4, at 14-16 n.34.
318 "The decision to adopt a tax system that provides opportunities for taxpayers to
exercise choice, and thus allows them to determine their own tax liability, reflects defer-
ence to the value of personal autonomy." Id. at 16.
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ter or erode the paradigm. What we believe to be true influences
our reality.
In America, what are our benefit expectations from our gov-
ernment? What do we expect to pay for our civilized society? The
answer to these questions may, in fact, vary depending upon our
individual historical perspectives. 19
Anyone 70 years old or older in America today, for example,
will have a very different personal, historical and cultural per-
spective than members of younger generations. These individuals
lived through the depths of the Great Depression as youngsters
and experienced first hand the implementation of the New Deal.
Sacrifice, hunger, and hard work were nothing new to them. They
witnessed the horrors of no federal unemployment insurance pro-
tection and no federal regulation of pensions, as well as destitu-
tion among injured family members who had no access to state or
federal disability assistance. In addition, these individuals were
witnesses to and participants in a world war fought from both
shores. They suffered the loss of nearly 300,000 lives at sea and
on foreign soil, and nearly 700,000 of them came home
wounded.320 They endured the mania of Hitler and the decimation
of six million Jews. And all of this became a part of their individ-
ual, historical perspectives before they were out of their 20s! Obvi-
ously, these experiences shaped their attitudes toward
government, benefit expectations, and the price that needed to be
paid for public welfare and protection.
The next generation, the so-called Baby Boom generation,
generally had a better life thanks to the sacrifice and hard work of
those who had gone before. Economic depression and world war
did not shape the beliefs of the Baby Boomers. They generally ex-
perienced less hardship and sacrifice, were the beneficiaries of
more government benefits and protections, enjoyed the idealism of
the Kennedy era, and suffered through the disillusion of the Viet-
nam War, assassinations, and Watergate. Now they are heading
toward retirement, expecting that the generation immediately be-
hind them will provide for them as they have provided for their
parents.
What is the strength of belief of those in their 20s and 30s
toward their responsibility for the welfare of the Baby Boomers
through the tax system? For the small percentage of the popula-
319 It is always dangerous to attempt to summarize attributes of entire generations of
people. For example, the media term "Generation X" has been used to describe an entire
generation of people roughly between the ages of 18 and 38, and yet 28-year old author
Michele Mitchell detests this term. See MICHELE MITCHELL, A NEW KIND OF PARTY ANIMAL:
How THE YOUNG ARE TEARING UP THE AMERICAN POLITICAL LANDSCAPE (1998); Dennis Mc-
Lellan, New Kids in the Bloc, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 30, 1998, at El (Orange County ed.). I will
attempt to avoid overly broad statements in my generational observations.
320 See STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 210, at 366 tbl.569.
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tion today who falls into this age bracket, the responsibility must
seem daunting.321 This generation was bussed to school in order to
effectuate integration, or their families moved to the suburbs to
avoid the issue. Before they were 20, they experienced America
putting a man on the moon, the end of the Vietnam War with
neither victory nor defeat, and the only resignation of a President
that America has ever known. In their 30s, they witnessed tax
reform which, when coupled with the continuation of major fed-
eral expenditures, resulted in the ballooning of the federal deficit
to its peak of $290.4 billion in 1992.322 Governmental expectations
became entrenched institutions of education and welfare.
What about those under the age of 20 today? They have
known only three Presidents-Reagan, Bush, and Clinton. In
many respects, this generation is a study in contrasts. For exam-
ple, a recent survey of our teens indicates that they are dramati-
cally lacking in knowledge of their government and their legal
system. Only 41% could name the three branches of government;
only 21% knew how many members were in the Senate; and only
2% knew the name of the Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme
Court. 23 These are the same children who have never known a
typewriter, and who receive vast amounts of information daily
through computers and the Internet.324 These children have exper-
ienced dramatic changes in the stock market and the general re-
surgence of a vital economy; yet 20% of all children living in
America today live in poverty.325 Nowhere is the line between the
"haves" and "have nots" greater than in this age group. 26 The
changing concept of family is also dramatically in evidence in this
age group. Three out of every 10 children under the age of 18 in
America today are being raised in a single-parent household; this
figure was just 1.3 out of 10 in 1970.327
321 There are approximately 76 million Baby Boomers. See Carolyn Lochhead, Clash of
the Titans: Collision Between Baby Boom Generation and the New Deal, REASON, Mar.
1997, at 42. See also Robert A. Rosenblatt, Securing the Future for Women, L.A. TIMES,
Jan. 27, 1999, at El (Orange County ed.). "The big debate deals with keeping Social Secur-
ity solvent so baby boomers can get their checks. The crisis year is 2032, when Social
Security will have consumed its surplus, and payroll taxes will be sufficient to pay only 75%
of benefits promised under current law." Id.
322 See ECONOMIc REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 373 tbl.B-78 (1998).
323 See Teens Know of DiCaprio but Not Rehnquist, L. A. TmEs, Sept. 3, 1998, at A17.
324 "[T]hree-quarters of young people aged between 15 and 24 are familiar with com-
puters." Spotlight: Personal Computers, MKT. WEEK, Feb. 19, 1998, at 38.
325 Poverty rates for all children in 1997 were at 19.9%. See JOSEPH DALAKER & MARY
NAIFEH, POVERTY IN THE UNITED STATES 1997, at vi (Bureau of the Census Current Popula-
tion Reports No. P60-201, 1998).
326 "[C]hildren continued to represent a large share of the poor population (40 percent)
even though they were only about one-fourth of the total population." Id.
327 Only 69% of these children are being raised in two-parent households; 31% are be-
ing raised in single-parent households. See STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 210, at 61
tbl.71. These figures contrast with 1970 figures of 87% of children living in two-parent
households and 13% in single-parent households. Id.
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What does all of this mean for the issue at hand-that of fed-
eral tax policy? I believe it means that we cannot and should not
make sweeping generalizations about what Americans want or
need when it comes to a federal tax system. We, as tax commenta-
tors, need to "keep perspective." We must remain ever vigilant
that economics does not so dominate our analysis that we forget
we are talking about people and not economic charts and models.
We must be ever sensitive to our cultural perspectives-our indi-
vidual histories, beliefs, and values and our perceptions about
those beliefs-when proposing and discussing federal tax policy
for the new millennium.
Most importantly, we must be ever vigilant to the fact that
wealth, no matter how defined-whether in terms of property or
income-equates into opportunity. We tax the wealthy at a
greater rate not necessarily because the wealthy derive more gov-
ernmental benefits, but rather because their wealth affords them
so much cultural opportunity.328 Professors Blum and Kalven ob-
serve that:
the gravest source of inequality of opportunity in our society is
not economic but rather what is called cultural inheritance for
lack of a better term. Under modern conditions the opportuni-
ties for formal education, healthful diet and medical attention to
some extent can be equalized by economic means without too
greatly disrupting the family. However, it still remains true
that even today much of the transmission of culture, in the nar-
row sense, occurs through the family, and no system of public
education and training can completely neutralize this form of
inheritance. Here it is the economic investment in the parents
328 We also must maintain a minimal, less burdensome connectedness to the non-
proximate stranger. At this minimal level of care, I need make no great sacrifices
to help the unmet others. Moreover, I need respond only to those others' most
urgent and basic demands. The basic needs of any person go beyond those of bare
survival to include attainment of the preconditions of liberty that allow us to be
free, voluntary agents working towards self-fulfillment. These conditions include
education and some level of personal safety and comfort. Only when a person has
these basics is she able to work towards her potential and self-fulfillment. The
minimal level of care, then, requires that I help others attain these basics so that
they have an opportunity to achieve self-fulfillment just as I do. Because it in-
volves a minimal level of responsibility, my obligation to help others attain this
state of opportunity does not require that I give up my own opportunity, nor even
that I constrain it very much. It does require that as my discretionary income
grows, I contribute money at a greater rate than previously to help others. This is
not an unduly burdensome obligation. It denies me no freedom of action. I can
still choose when, where, and how much to work. I am still rewarded for my ef-
forts. The income contribution required of me will not be so large as to unduly
handicap my own attempts at self-fulfillment. As my income grows, it is easier for
me to contribute more without impinging on my ability to reach my own goals. My
minimal obligation to others requires that I contribute that nonintrusive amount.
Thus, a progressive income tax rate satisfies my obligation to myself and others.
It is not a redistribution of wealth, merely a paying off of my "just debts" to others.
Kornhauser, supra note 234, at 510-11.
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and the grandparents, irrevocably in the past, which produces
differential opportunities for the children.329
IV. CONCLUSION
Our initial inquiry may be wrong. We should not be analyz-
ing the tax side of the federal income tax as much as the income
side of the equation. For me, the problem is not so much with the
federal income tax and its distributional effects, but rather with
the issue of income-who has it and who does not, as well as who
has an opportunity to have it and who does not. The issue is not so
much a matter that Americans need less taxes; rather, they need
more income.
This conclusion brings us back to our historical and cultural
perspective. Historically, Americans were taxed through a con-
sumption-based system of excise taxes and tariffs imposed upon
the purchase of goods. These taxes were perceived to be unfair
because very few Americans had any income of which to speak.
Before the days of government regulation and unions, men, wo-
men, and children of all ages slaved in jobs for exceedingly long
hours, and under gruesome conditions, and for very little pay.
The burden of excise taxes and tariffs fell disproportionately upon
the working class. These hardworking Americans were not em-
powered; they often lacked education, suffered from racial and
ethnic discrimination, and initially lacked organization. Most im-
portantly, the burdens of economic development were intention-
ally thrust upon the unempowered poor.
Thus the problem is, historically, what it has always been: the
gross disparity in the distribution of income throughout the U.S.
population. This article has repeatedly highlighted the ever-pres-
ent income disparity throughout our history. Depressingly, the in-
come disparities of today are painfully reminiscent of the statistics
of 1860, 1890, and 1920. Our "evolved" Internal Revenue Code
does little to remedy this income disparity, but rather exacerbates
it with a plethora of tax preference items favoring wealthy owners
of capital. At a minimum, Congress needs to return the Code to
its original constitutional mandate of taxing "income from
whatever source derived," broadening the tax base by eliminating
many of the tax preference items that disproportionately favor the
wealthy in the name of "stimulating the economy."
Our cultural perspective reveals that we will likely not em-
brace a wholesale substitution for our current income tax system,
that the wealthy, predominantly male politicians will continue to
perpetuate their self-preservationist agenda through the tax sys-
329 Walter J. Blum & Harry Kalven, Jr., The Uneasy Case for Progressive Taxation, 19
U. CHi. L. REv. 417, 504 (1952).
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tern, that tax expenditure items have severely enhanced the dis-
proportionality of income distribution throughout the United
States, that a rational, economic solution may not address our ba-
sically irrational economic nature, that fundamental reform is not
likely to survive the harsh reality of the American political pro-
cess, and that we have been cajoled into believing that the Inter-
nal Revenue Code can cure all social and economic ills. Not an
optimistic, uplifting summation, I realize, but a culturally and his-
torically accurate one nonetheless.
Perhaps our system of taxation is not as civilized as we would
like because our society is not as civilized as it could be. After all,
our system of taxation can only be as civilized as our society. If
taxes are, in fact, the price we pay for a civilized society, we are
not getting our money's worth under the current federal income
tax system.
Chapman Law Review
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INST'RU TI7ONS.
1. This return shall be mad by every ciizn of the United
States, whether resding at home or abroed, and by every person
residing In the United States, though not a citizen thereof, having
a ne ineote of 13,00 or ever he the taxable year, and alm by
every nonresident afien deriving income from property owned
and busines, toade, or professim carred on in Me United Stats
by him.
2. When an individual by reasn of minority, stdkam or
other dilbihty. or absence from the United States, is unable to
make his own return, it may be made for him by his d outlor-
i d repreeentitive.
3. The .eo-ol &= of I pear cent shall be asmesed an the total
net income les the specific exemption of $3,000 or 84,000 s the
case may be. (For the year 1913, the specific exemption allow-
able is 2,800 or $3,383.33, as the cas may be) jIf, however,
the normal tax has been deducted and withheld on any part of
the income at the uce, or if any part of the income is received
an dividends upon the stock or frem the net earnings of any cor-
poration, etc.. which is taxable upon its net income, such income
shall be deducted from the individual's total " insat for the
purpose of calculating the Amount of income on which the Indi-
vidual is liable for the normal tax of I per cout by virtue of this
return. (See page 1, line 7.)
4. The atSional or super fa shall be calculated as mated on
page 1.
3. This return shall be Sled with the Collector of Internal
Revenue for the district in which the individual resides if he has
no other place of business, otherwise in the distritt in which he
has his prinecipal pla of busines- or in case the person resides in
a foreign country, then with the collector for the distict in
which his principal busnss is carried on in the United States.
0. This return must be filed on or before the firt day of March
succeeding the close of the calendar yea for which return is made.
7. The penalty for/aifure o fle return athin t&e ine spci.
ftdbylo is$20to$1,00. In caeofrefumlornelecttorender
the return within the required time (except in cases of sickness
or absence), l0 per cenc shall be added to amount of tax smemed.
In case offafse orfraudulrent return, 100 per cent shall be added to
such t2x, and any person required bylaw to make, render, sip,
or verily ny return who makes any fale or fraudulent return or
statement with intent to doeat or evade the assessment required
by this section to be made shall- be guilty of a misdemeanor, and
shall be fined not exceeding 2,000 or be imprieoed not exceed-
ing one year, or both, at the discretion of the court, with the costa
of prosecution.
S. When the retan is not filed within the required time by
reason of sicknees or absence of the individual, an extension of
time, not exceeding 30 days from March 1, within which to file
sucb return, may be granted by the collector, provided an appli-
cation therefor is made by the individual within the period for
which each extension is dedred.
9. This return properly filled out must be made under oath
or affirmation. Affidavits may be made before any officer
auihor.d by laot to administer oaths. If before a justice of the
peace or magistrate, not using a esI, a teeutoaft of the ciok of the
otm at to the -torib, of such oEer to administer oaths should
be etterhsd to the return.
10. Expense for medical attendance, tor accounts, family
supplies, wages of domestic servants, cost of board, room, or
house rent for family or petrsnal use, or not erpens tat can be
dedefftant gross anms. In can an individual owts his own
residence he can not deduct the estimated value of his rent,
neither shall be be required to include ech tinated meutl of
his home as income.
11. The farmer, in computing the net income from his farm for
his annual return, hll include all moneys received for produce
and -i mid, and for the wool and hides of animals slaugh-
tered, provided such wool and hides re oid, and he shell deduct
therefrom the sums actually paid a purchase money for the
animals mid or slaughtered during the year.
When animals were raised by the owner and are mid or slsugh.
tered he shall not deduct their value as expenses or Ins. He
may deduct the amount of money actally paid s expense for
producing any farm products, live -1ork, etc. In deducting
expees for repair ot fam property the amount deducted mum
not exceed the amount actually expended foe such epai dur-
ing the yer fee which the retu Is made. (See pog e, item 6.)
The cot of replacing tools or machinery is a deductible expense
to the extent that the eost of the new articles does not exceed
the value of the old.
12. In calculating toes, only ech losss w shall have been
actually sustained and the smount of which has been definitely
ascertained during the year covered by the return can be deducted.
13. Persons receiving fees or emoluments for professonal or
other services, as in the case of physicians or lawyers, should
include all actual receipts fr services rendered in the year for
which return is made, together with all unpaid accounts, charge
for services, or contingent income due for that year, if good and
collectible.
14. Debts which were contracted during the yer fhr which
return is made, but found in mid year to be worthie, may be
deducted from grosi income for maid year, but such debts can
not be regarded as worthlem until after legal proceedings to
recover the seine have proved fruitlem, er it dearly appears that
the debtor is insolvent. If debts contracted prior to the year
for which return is made were included as income in return for
year in which sid debts were contracted, and each debts shaI
subsequently prove to be worthlem, they may be deducted under
the bkd of toom in the return for the year in which such debts
were cherged off as worthless.
15. 'Amounts due or accrued to the individual members of a
partnership from the net earnings of the partnership, whether
apportioned and distributed or not, shall be included in the
annual return of the individual.
15. United States pensions shall be included " income.
17. Estimated advance in value of real estate is not required
to beer e income, nlem the increased value is taken up
on the banks of the individual as an increase of mets.
is. Costs of suits and other legal proceeding. arising rom ordi-
nary business may be treated ss an expense of such business, and
may be deducted from gros income for the year in which such
oots were paid.
19. An unmarried individual or a married individual not living
with wife or husband shall be allowed an exemption of $3,000.
When husband and wife live together they shall be allowed
jointly a total exemption of only $4,000 on their agregate income.
They may make a joint return, both subscribing thereto. or If
they have Separate incomes, they may mak, separate returns;
bt in no case shall they jointly claim m ore than 4,000 exemp-
tion on their aggregate income.
:0. In computing tet income there shell be excluded the
compensation of all officen and employees of a State or any
political subdivision thereof, except when such compensation is
paid by the United States Government. , a-3er
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